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This paper reviews the economics literature on welfare reform over the 1990s. A brief summary
of the policy changes over this period is followed by a discussion of the methodological techniques
utilized to analyze the effects of these changes on outcomes. The paper then critically reviews the
econometric and experimental literature on caseload changes, labor force changes, poverty and income
changes, and family formation changes. A growing body of evidence suggests that the recent policy
changes have influenced economic behavior and well-being in a variety of ways. One particular set of
“new-style” welfare programs seems to show especially promising results, with significantly increased
work and earnings and reduced poverty.
Rebecca M. Blank









  Over the 1990s the United States fundamentally changed the structure of its 
public assistance programs to low-income families.  These policy changes have, in turn, 
generated a growing body of economic research that has evaluated their effects.  This 
article reviews the major changes in U.S. welfare programs over the 1990s and critiques 
some of the key methodological approaches and results in areas where a substantial 
economic research literature has accumulated.  I particularly focus on areas where the 
new research contributes to long-standing debates. 
  It is worth noting that the U.S. policy changes have been much discussed in other 
countries and the evaluation literature from the U.S. may be increasingly relevant to 
policy debates elsewhere.  For instance, in 1996, Canada gave provinces greater 
discretion over their social assistance programs, similar to changes the U.S.  As we shall 
discuss below, Canada enacted a very interesting demonstration program in the 1990s 
(the Self Sufficiency Project), designed to move women on welfare into work.  In 1999, 
Great Britain enacted the Working Families Tax Credit, a generous tax credit for low-
income working families, similar to the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit program.  Some 
communities in Germany are imposing time limits on the receipt of public assistance 
(Feist and Schöb, 1998).   In contrast to earlier decades, when the different design and 
lower generosity of U.S. social welfare programs led U.S. policies to be dismissed as 
irrelevant or aberrant by other westernized nations, during the 1990s many of these 
countries watched the U.S. welfare experiments with great interest.
1  
                                                           
1 Not discussed here are social insurance programs such as Social Security or Unemployment Insurance, 
around which there has also been a great deal of trans-Atlantic conversation.    4
I.  Federal Changes in U.S. Welfare Programs Over the 1990s 
  The U.S. enacted major welfare reform legislation in August, 1996.  The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) passed with a 
relatively high degree of bipartisan support.  President Bill Clinton had, however, vetoed 
two earlier versions of this bill and it remained controversial.  Several of his senior 
advisors resigned in protest when he signed PRWORA into law.
2 
  The major provisions of PRWORA included: 
•  Devolution of greater program authority to the states.  PRWORA replaced the 
federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC) – the primary 
cash assistance program for low-income families -- with the Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) block grant.  This essentially removed almost all federal 
eligibility and payment rules, giving states much greater discretion in designing their 
own cash public assistance programs.  This also eliminated a federal entitlement to 
cash assistance.  States could choose which families they supported. 
 
•  Changes in financing.  TANF replaced a matching fund arrangement under AFDC, in 
which federal funding moved up or down with state funding.  The TANF block grant 
was fixed and the contribution for each state was determined by the federal AFDC 
matching grant contribution in the years prior to PRWORA.  States were required to 
maintain at least 75 percent of their previous state spending levels on AFDC in order 
to receive the full block grant.
3 
 
•  Ongoing work requirements.  By 2002, at least 50 percent of all recipient families and 
90 percent of two-parent families were required to be working or in work preparation 
programs, although states were given great discretion to design and implement these 
programs.  The law treated caseload reductions as similar to work, however.  Thus, a 
state which reduced its caseload by 50 percent would meet its work requirement, 
regardless of how many current or former recipients were actually employed. 
 
•  Incentives to reduce non-marital births.  There was more rhetoric than program in the 
legislation in this area, but three of the four stated goals of PRWORA involved 
reducing non-marital births and encouraging marriage.  States that reduced out-of-
wedlock child bearing without raising abortion rates qualified for special bonuses. 
                                                           
2 For a detailed description of the events leading up to this legislation, see Weaver (2000).  For further 
discussion about the provisions of PRWORA see Blank (1997b) or Blank and Ellwood (2002).  Moffitt 
(1999b) discusses the factors behind PRWORA’s passage.  Moffitt (forthcoming) provides a more detailed 
summary of the changes from AFDC to TANF.  
3 Not included in this paper is any discussion of the public finance literature that investigates the potential 
impact of block grants on welfare funding.  For a good overview of these issues, see Chernick (1998).   5
 
•  Five year maximum time limit.  PRWORA set a lifetime limit of 60 months on the 
receipt of TANF-funded aid.  States could exempt up to 20 percent of their caseload 
from this limit, could set shorter time limits if they chose, or could continue funding 
assistance to families entirely out of state funds after 60 months. 
 
Although this paper will focus less on these issues, PRWORA also imposed additional 
limits on eligibility for Food Stamps and Supplemental Security Income (SSI, the cash 
assistance program to low-income aged and disabled individuals) among certain 
populations.  Legal immigrants who arrived after August 1996 were largely denied access 
to TANF and to these other programs; the impact of this policy change will grow over 
time as an increasing share of U.S. immigrants will have arrived post-PRWORA.   
Finally, PRWORA made changes designed to encourage greater paternity establishment 
and more payment of child support by absent parents.  
  While the 1996 legislation has received the most public attention, it was preceded 
by a variety of earlier and significant changes.  Growing dissatisfaction with AFDC had 
led an increasing number of states to seek waivers from the AFDC rules.  These waivers 
were mostly designed to allow states to more stringently enforce work requirements for 
welfare recipients.  Such waivers had started under President Ronald Reagan, but the 
Clinton Administration actively encouraged more expansive state-wide waiver programs.   
As a result, by the time PRWORA passed, 27 states had major state-wide waivers in 
place.  Most of these states designed new TANF-funded welfare programs that were 
closely based on their waiver experiments, although virtually all waiver states used their 
new discretion under PRWORA to make additional program changes. 
All of these waiver programs had to be seriously evaluated by the states that 
implemented them.  The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which   6
approved and administered the waivers, typically required some form of random-
assignment evaluation.  Over time, this generated a body of literature about welfare-to-
work programs that was crucial in convincing people that such programs could have 
positive effects on earnings and labor supply and negative effects on welfare spending.  
Along with reform of traditional cash welfare programs, there were also major changes in 
federal legislation affecting low wage jobs and workers over the 1990s.  The minimum 
wage rose from $3.35 at the end of 1989 to $5.15 in 1997.  By 2000, this left real 
minimum wages 10.8 percent above their levels in 1989.  
Even more important, one of the first legislative proposals from the Clinton 
administration to receive Congressional approval in 1993 was a major expansion of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  The EITC operates as a refundable tax credit through 
the federal tax system to subsidize low wage workers in low income families.  Figure 1 
describes the EITC subsidy as of 2000.  Nonworkers receive no subsidy.  Low income 
low wage workers with one child (two or more children) are initially subsidized at a rate 
of 34 percent (40 percent).  Over some income range they receive a flat subsidy of $2353 
($3888), and as their income increases further this is taxed away at a rate of 15.98 percent 
(21.06 percent).  This subsidy offsets federal income tax obligations (including taxes that 
fund the Social Security and Medicaid programs) and results in subsidies (checks from 
the government) for workers whose EITC subsidy is greater than their tax obligations.
4   
The combination of increased minimum wages and increased EITC subsidies 
meant that the real earnings plus wage subsidy (in 2000 dollars) received by a woman 
with one child working full time at the minimum wage rose from $10,568 in 1989 to 
                                                           
4 More detail on the EITC is available in U.S. House of Representatives (2000, p808-813).  For a history of 
the EITC, see Ventry (2000).    7
$12,653 in 2000, a 19.7 percent increase.  For a similar woman with two or more 
children, real earnings and subsidies rose from $10,568 in 1989 to $14,188 in 2000, a 
34.3 percent increase.  These changes should have greatly increased the work incentives 
for low-wage single mothers with children. 
Two other federal legislative changes also deserve mention.  First, from the mid-
1980s on, access to public health insurance became increasingly delinked from 
participation in cash public assistance programs.  By 1999, all children in families whose 
income was below 100 percent of the poverty line were eligible for Medicaid, the 
publicly-funded health insurance program for low-income persons.
5  In addition, women 
who left welfare for work were eligible for one year of transitional Medicaid coverage.
6  
Because many eligible children did not appear to be accessing Medicaid, in 1997 
Congress funded a $24 billion, 5-year program known as the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP), providing incentives and funding to states to expand health care usage 
and health insurance access among low-income children.  
There were also substantial changes in subsidies for child care assistance.  
PRWORA abolished a plethora of older programs and created a single Child Care and 
Development Block Grant.  States were also allowed to use a certain share of their TANF 
funds for child care.  In addition, there were expansions in the Child Care Tax Credit for 
lower middle income families.
7 
                                                           
5 Since 1983, all pregnant women and children age 5 or less in families with incomes below 133 percent of 
the Federal poverty line have access to Medicaid; 23 states use a higher cutoff point.  Older children, born 
after September 1983, in families below 100 percent of the poverty line are also covered by Medicaid; 26 
states set a higher cutoff point for eligibility for these older children (Ku, Ullman and Almeida, 1999).   For 
more detail on Medicaid and how it operates, see Gruber (forthcoming). 
6 Thirteen states extend this for more than one year. 
7 Loprest, Schmidt and Witte (2000) discuss these changes in more detail.  For a summary of the research 
on the impacts of child care subsidies, see Blau (forthcoming) and  Anderson and Levine (2000).   8
Combined, these changes constitute a revolution in public assistance programs 
within the United States over this past decade.  Federal dollars available to support 
working low income families increased from $11.0 billion in 1988 to $66.7 billion in 
1999.
8  Dollars paid in cash welfare support to (largely nonworking) families headed by 
non-elderly, non-disabled adults rose from $24 billion in 1988 to $27 billion in 1992, 
then fell to $13 billion by 1999 (all numbers in 2000 dollars).  This suggests that the work 
incentives imbedded in the public assistance system should have increased markedly over 
this period:  cash assistance became far less available, welfare recipients were pushed 
much harder to find employment and leave the rolls, the returns to low wage work rose, 
and the availability of work supports (child care and health insurance) increased to low 
income families.    
Not unimportant, these changes took place at the same time as a major economic 
boom.  The U. S. unemployment rate fell to 5 percent in April, 1997, and remained at or 
below this level until October 2001.   Most places experienced worker shortages in the 
years following the passage of the 1996 legislation, making employers more willing to 
hire ex-welfare recipients.  Wages among less skilled workers started to rise in 1995, for 
the first time since the late 1970s (Blank and Schmidt, 2001).   This meant that the 
macroeconomy  reinforced and supported the direction of legislative change over the 
1990s.  In many ways, the late 1990s were the best time imaginable to enact and 
implement work-oriented welfare reform.  
                                                           
8 Blank and Ellwood (2002, Figure 1).  This includes dollars spent on the EITC, child care assistance to 
poor and near-poor families, and Medicaid and CHIP expenditures on low-income children and adults who 
are not receiving cash assistance.  It does not include money spent on job training or job placement 
assistance, or cash benefits paid to working families.   9
II.  The State Response 
Describing the Federal changes provides only half of the picture.  After the 
passage of PRWORA each state began to design and enact its own TANF-funded 
program.
9 
Historically, analysis of public assistance programs has focused on two 
parameters: benefit levels and benefit reduction rates (BRRs).  Figure 2 shows the income 
available to a low-wage family under a typical welfare program.  A maximum benefit 
level, G, is available to non-workers.  Workers earn an hourly wage rate w.  As hours of 
work (and earnings) increase, benefits are taxed away at a rate t (the BRR).  Ongoing 
historical discussion has focused on the trade-offs of higher benefits (raising G provides a 
stronger safety net but discourages work and raises program costs) and higher BRRs 
(raising t reduces the return to low levels of work but leads to lower program costs).  The 
Negative Income Tax experiments of the 1970s were largely experiments involving 
different levels of G and t (Burtless, 1986; Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990).  
Frustration with the work disincentives imbedded in traditional welfare programs 
led President Reagan to promote welfare-to-work programs in the early 1980s. 
Mandatory job search or job placement programs would replace the endless effort to 
tinker with the contradictory incentives imbedded in a given level of G and t, by forcing 
welfare recipients to work regardless of the resulting loss in benefit income.  A strong  
version of work requirements is a so-called “workfare” program, which mandates a 
certain level of work in a publicly provided job as a condition of ongoing welfare receipt.  
A less extreme requirement might mandate participation in a job preparation or job 
                                                           
9 For a description of the structure of means-tested programs prior to 1996, see Blank (1997a).   10
search program.  A wide variety of states have experimented with different versions of 
work requirements over the past 20 years.   
Initially using waivers and later using their authority under PRWORA, states have 
transformed the nature of public assistance programs.  While benefit levels and BRRs 
remain important parameters, states are increasingly using a wide variety of additional 
program design components to promote work and to reduce caseloads.  What follows is a 
brief description of these changes.  What will be clear is that both the number of possible 
program parameters available to states has increased markedly, and that different states 
are choosing very different combinations of these parameters.  Hence, the variance across 
states in their TANF-funded programs is enormous and still growing. 
Benefit Levels. States have always been able to choose their own maximum 
benefit levels for non-workers.  This part of the system has changed little.  Most states 
over the 1990s made only small legislative changes in their benefit levels, even after the 
passage of PRWORA.  In fact, the overwhelming trend in benefit levels in the 1990s has 
been inflation erosion in benefits (a trend visible since the early 1970s).  Table 1 indicates 
that the median benefit level (in $2000) fell from $480/month for a family of three to 
$379 between 1990 and 2000.  Most of this decline was due to inflation erosion.  Similar 
changes occurred across the distribution of benefit levels, as Table 1 indicates.
10  
As cash assistance becomes less broadly available, benefit levels are of decreasing 
importance.  The steady decline in benefit levels, however, should increase work 
incentives over this period. 
Benefit Reduction Rates.  Under AFDC, BRRs were set by federal law (although a 
few states received waivers to experiment with alternative BRRs in the early 1990s).    11
BRRs had been raised significantly in the early 1980s, and many AFDC recipients faced 
almost 100 percent tax rates on their earnings.  
A major change post-PRWORA is that many states have chosen lower BRRs, in 
order to encourage work (and to a lesser extent, as a way of supplementing income 
among low-wage workers).  Free to set their own rules, many states have also chosen to 
have BRRs rise at some point after a woman goes to work, so her public assistance 
subsidy is reduced over time even if her earnings do not increase.   
Table 2 is based on calculations of the cumulative cash welfare benefits available 
over the first 24 months of work by a welfare recipient with two children whose earnings 
are $6/hour (slightly above the minimum wage of $5.15 per hour) and who works part-
time (30 hours/week) or full-time (40 hours/week).  The first two columns show the 
cumulative cash benefits that a welfare recipient family would have expected to receive  
in each state in January 1996 (all numbers adjusted to 2000 dollars) if the mother went to 
work under the old AFDC program.  The second two columns show the cumulative cash 
benefits that a family would have expected to receive in 2000 if the mother went to work 
under each state’s TANF program.   
The AFDC program provided little cash support to workers.  Almost half the 
states in 1995 would have paid no cash benefits to a part-time worker.
11  Only 13 states 
would have provided any support to a full-time worker.  
By 2000, BRRs had fallen in almost all states, dramatically changing these 
results.  Almost all states provide some support to the mother who enters part-time work 
in 2000; in 28 states this support exceeds $1000 over the first 24 months of work.   Half 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 The standard deviation in benefits across states changed little over these 10 years.   12
the states also provide some cash supplement to the woman who enters full-time work,
12 
with the median state paying  $299 in cumulative cash benefits over the first 24 months.  
Sixteen states pay more than $1000 in benefits over these first 24 months.
13 
A change in the BRR is equivalent to a change in the effective wage rate (see 
Figure 2).  Because this imbeds both income and substitution effects, it is theoretically 
ambiguous whether work incentives should rise or fall.  Most labor economists assume 
that substitution effects dominate income effects for low wage workers.  This suggests 
that lower BRRs should increase work incentives.   Moffitt (1992) notes the remarkable 
historical inelasticity of responsiveness among welfare recipients to changes in BRRs, 
however, which suggests that the work incentive effect of lowering BRRs in the mid-
1990s might not be large.   On the other hand, the changes in BRRs implemented in the 
1990s were often made in conjunction with strong work requirements.  As the discussion 
of financial incentive programs in Section VIII below indicates, the combination of lower 
BRRs and work mandates may have a quite powerful combined effect. 
Note that lower BRRs may have other effects as well.  In the presence of time 
limits, lower BRRs keep welfare recipients on welfare longer and encourage families to 
“use up” their time.  If clients are aware of time limits and worried about using up their 
public assistance eligibility, this will further increase their incentives to work and may 
lead them to leave welfare even while still eligible for some benefits in order to preserve 
future months’ welfare eligibility. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 Differences across the states in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 are entirely due to differences in AFDC 
benefit maximums across states; all states are subject to identical (federally determined) BRRs. 
12 Cumulative benefits equal 0 for a woman earning $6/hour if BRRs are very high (and in some states they 
are 100 percent, so benefits are reduced $1 for $1 of earnings) and/or if benefit levels are very low (so that 
one “works one’s way off welfare” more quickly).   
13 More detailed information on these earnings disregard calculations are available from the author upon 
request.   13
Welfare-to-Work Programs.  Virtually all states have tried to expand their 
welfare-to-work programs starting in the early 1980s.  Since the passage of PRWORA, 
states are mandating participation in job search assistance and work preparation among a 
much higher share of their caseload.  By 1999 states reported that 38.3 percent of their 
caseload was engaged in work or job activities, up from 20.4 percent in 1994.
14   
The exact meaning of “welfare-to-work” varies substantially across states.  In the 
early 1990s, many states ran both job placement and job training programs.  By the late 
1990s, the focus of most state programs was “work first”, aimed at getting recipients into 
a job as soon as possible.  Hence, most programs focus on narrow job preparation skills 
(interviewing, getting along on the job, organizing child care) and job search assistance.  
Relatively little money is currently being spent on longer-term training, a somewhat 
controversial fact in many states.
15 
These work programs should increase work incentives, both by improving 
employment-related skills and by establishing job search as an expected activity for 
welfare recipients.  Indeed, a number of states have focused on changing the “culture” of 
their public assistance offices, retraining and reorganizing staff so that their primary goal 
is to encourage work rather than to provide monthly assistance (Gais, et. al., 2001).  
Sanctions.  To enforce job search and work requirements, states have 
implemented a variety of sanction policies aimed primarily at penalizing individuals who 
do not respond to work requirements (most commonly, these are individuals who miss 
                                                           
14 The 1994 data is from U.S. House of Representatives (2000, Table 7-25).  The 1999 data is from U.S. 
DHHS (2000, Table 3:1). 
15 See discussion of this issue by Strawn, Greenberg, and Savner (2001).  Job training or education among 
adults can be counted as a work activity, but cannot count toward the first 20 hours/week of required work 
participation. 
An exception is teen mothers under age 18, who are required to participate in education activities unless 
they hold a high school degree.    14
required job preparation or job search sessions).  Sanctions involve a reduction in welfare 
benefits, but states vary in how much they reduce benefits and for how long.  Pavetti and 
Bloom (2001) classify 25 states as “strict”, including a number of states that impose 
permanent full benefit losses on the families of noncompliant individuals.  They classify 
13 states as “lenient,” imposing only temporary and partial reductions. 
If low BRRs are the “carrot” for participating in welfare-to-work programs 
(providing ongoing subsidies to those who can only find low wage jobs), then sanctions 
are the “stick.”  All states have some form of sanctioning policy, which is to say that no 
state relies only on positive work incentives to get people employed.  
Time Limits.  While all states are subject to the 60 month federal time limit for 
individuals using TANF-related funds, they can also set shorter time limits, or can 
provide state funding beyond 60 months.
16  Seventeen states have time limits of less than 
60 months for some families, 26 states use the 60 month federal time limit, and 8 states 
have not imposed time limits which mandatorily end all benefits.
17  For instance, several 
of these states impose time limits on adult recipients but continue benefits for children 
(Pavetti and Bloom, 2001). 
Time limits should have two work-inducing effects.  First, they should provide 
incentives for recipients who might need welfare in the future to leave welfare as rapidly 
as possible, in order to preserve future eligibility.
18  This requires a thorough 
understanding of the fact that “the clock is ticking” and some states have been better at 
reminding recipients of this.  There is some evidence that many recipients misunderstand 
                                                           
16 States are allowed to exempt up to 20 percent of their caseload from the 60-month time limit. 
17 As in Tables 1 and 2, Washington, D.C.c is included as the 51
st “state”. 
18 For example, Swann (2000) develops a model indicating that time limits will have larger effects when 
welfare recipients are forward looking.   15
where they are on their time clock (Bloom, 1999).  Second, once time limits are imposed, 
ex-recipients can no longer use cash assistance as a back-up to work. 
Time limits have not yet been widely imposed;  the first recipients did not begin 
to hit the 60 month limit in most states until late 2001 or early 2002.  As noted before, 
there are somewhat perverse interactions between time limits and lower BRRs.  In 
addition, there is also evidence that time limits and sanctions interact in interesting ways.  
Sanctions tend to affect the same less responsive and often more disadvantaged 
population that is likely to hit time limits.  This suggests that time limits may not have a 
very large effect if many individuals will have already been removed from eligibility 
through sanctions (Pavetti and Bloom, 2001). 
Diversion.  With no national entitlement to public assistance, states can deny 
assistance to individuals.  Many states have implemented eligibility determination 
processes that encourage some applicants to be diverted from cash public assistance.  Ten 
states impose work search requirements on applicants prior to eligibility (i.e., applicants 
must show that they’ve applied for a certain number of jobs as a condition of eligibility).  
Twelve states provide short-term cash payments as an alternative to public assistance 
eligibility, designed to meet some immediate need of the applicant which will then allow 
her to return to work.  Nine states use both techniques in order to divert applicants from 
welfare, while 20 states make no effort at diversion.
19 
Work Support Subsidies.  With more attention to moving welfare recipients into 
work, states have also recognized the need to help families with work-related expenses.  
States have greatly increased their expenditures on work support programs, primarily 
child care subsidies.  Between 1993 and 2000, federal funds available to the states for   16
child care subsidies rose from $9.5 billion to $18 billion, an 89 percent increase.
20  States 
are also helping to fund work transportation expenses, or job search expenses.  Indeed, 
more money is currently going into work support, including child care and transportation 
subsidies, wage subsidies, as well as cash payments to working families, than into cash 
assistance to non-working families (Gais, et. al., 2001).  
While this review focuses primarily on the changes outlined above to cash 
assistance and work-related programs, it is worth noting that these changes have had a 
substantial impact on the utilization of other non-cash public assistance programs as well. 
AFDC was historically the gateway program through which families were also certified 
for Food Stamps or Medicaid.  As access to cash assistance has fallen, Food Stamp usage 
has fallen as well.
 21  Working poor families seem to find it particularly difficult to access 
Food Stamps.  Offices are often open only during daytime hours and persons must 
regularly report to the office in person to maintain eligibility.  The complexity of 
calculating Food Stamp amounts for working individuals, whose Food Stamp benefit 
level will change from month to month as their earnings vary, often creates incentives for 
caseworkers to try and get workers off the Food Stamp rolls.  Arcane rules about the 
resale value of a car and other assets limits can also restrict eligibility.  The net result is a 
program with very low participation among eligible families with a working adult head, 
despite the declared goal of Food Stamps to provide assistance to all low-income 
families.  For instance, in 1999 only 43 percent of eligible persons with earnings were 
receiving Food Stamps, while 70 percent of eligible nonearners were participating 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 For one of the few discussions of state diversion strategies, see Maloy, et. al. (1999). 
20 Provided by Ron Haskins, based on calculations with data from the Congressional Research Service. 
21 For further discussion of the problems with Food Stamp access post-PRWORA, see Greenstein and 
Guyer (2001) and Zedlewski (2001).   17
(USDA, 2000).  Of course, this may merely reflect an effort to structure the program so 
that only the most needy among the eligible will actually participate, consistent with the 
argument in Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982).
22  Efforts are currently underway to reduce 
these barriers to Food Stamp participation among working families. 
  
III.  Changes in Behavior and Well-Being Over the 1990s 
At the same time as major changes in program structure occurred during the 
1990s, there were also stunning changes in behavior.  Strong adjectives are appropriate to 
describe these behavioral changes.  Nobody – of any political persuasion – predicted or 
would have believed possible the magnitude of change that occurred in the behavior of 
low-income single-parent families over this decade. 
Caseload Changes.  The most-discussed change over the 1990s was a remarkably 
rapid decline in caseloads between 1994 and 2000, illustrated in Figure 3.  The vertical 
line indicates passage of the 1996 legislation.  Between 1994 and 2000, caseloads 
declined by 56.5 percent.  Furthermore, these declines occurred everywhere in the nation, 
with every state experiencing strong reductions in their welfare rolls. 
Three things should be noted about the data underlying Figure 3.  First, the rapid 
caseload decline after 1994 was preceded by an unexpectedly strong increase in caseloads 
in the early 1990s.  Despite a relatively mild economic slowdown, caseloads rose 27 
percent between 1990 and 1994.  This rise in caseloads was one of the driving forces 
behind the desire of state governors to implement more radical welfare reform.  Ideally, 
any theory that explains the caseload decline of the late 1990s should also explain the 
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one.  For a discussion of takeup in the Food Stamp and the AFDC program, see Blank and Ruggles (1996).   18
caseload rise of the early 1990s.  As discussed below, most researchers have focused on 
the decline in caseloads without paying attention to the earlier rise. 
Second, caseloads start to decline well before the enactment of the 1996 
legislation, suggesting that legislation was not solely responsible for the caseload decline.  
Third, the caseload decline in the late 1990s far exceeds anything in previous decades.  
Despite relatively strong economic growth from 1983 to 1989, there is little evidence of 
any change in caseload levels over that time period.  This suggests that the economy 
alone cannot explain caseload changes in the 1990s.  The strong economic growth of the 
1960s is actually correlated with a rise in caseloads.  Most observers ascribe this to 
increased take-up of welfare programs among the eligible following the launch of 
President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty (Moffitt, 1992).  This at least suggests that 
take-up changes might be important in the 1990s as well. 
Labor Force Participation Changes.  Changes in caseloads by themselves are not 
very informative, and immediately lead to questions about the behavior and income of 
those who are no longer receiving welfare.  In particular, one of the major goals of the 
1996 legislation and the policy changes that preceded it was to increase work effort 
among welfare recipients.  As it turns out, work effort soared over this time period among 
single mothers with children. 
Figure 4 presents labor force participation rates among women by marital status 
and presence of children from 1989 through 2000.  Unmarried women without children 
work at a high and unchanged level throughout this time period.  Married women, both 
with and without children, show steady increases in labor force participation over the 
1990s, at a slightly slower rate than in earlier decades.    19
In sharp contrast, single mothers with children show little change in their labor 
force participation rates through the 1980s and into the mid-1990s.  But between 1994 
and 1999 their labor force participation rises by 10 percentage points.  Among single 
mothers with children under the age of six, labor force participation rates rise by 5 
percentage points.  In short, at exactly the same time as caseloads start to fall, work effort 
rises substantially among exactly the population most affected by the caseload declines.  
This provides at least prima facae evidence that the caseload declines were associated 
with increases in work.  Other available data supports the idea that women are moving 
from welfare to work at a high rate.  Among those who report receiving public assistance 
income in the previous year, the share reporting themselves employed in March of the 
following year rises from 19.8 percent in 1990 to 44.3 percent in 2000.
23 
Even among women who remain on welfare, work effort rises strongly.  This may 
reflect both the greater effort to move welfare recipients into work, as well as the lower 
benefit reduction rates that continue subsidies to working women as their earnings rise.  
Among women on welfare, the share with earnings rises from 6.7 percent in 1990 to 28.1 
percent by 1999.
24   
Increases in work not only increase earnings and add to immediate family income, 
but may also build labor force experience that leads to higher wages over time.  Gladden 
and Taber (2000) indicate that even among low-skilled women wages increase with 
experience. 
                                                           
23 Calculated by the author from March Current Population Survey data.  Bishop (1998) also provides 
detailed information on labor supply increases among never-married women in the 1990s. 
24 This is all the more remarkable in light of the amazing inelasticity of work effort among welfare 
recipients in previous decades, discussed by Moffitt (1992).  The 1990 data is from U.S. House of 
Representatives (1998, Table 7-19); The 1999 data is from U.S. DHHS (2000, Table 3:3.c).   20
Changes in Income and Poverty.  Declines in public assistance usage and 
increases in labor market involvement may or may not signal income increases, since 
reductions in welfare benefits will offset increases in earnings.  Hence, there has been a 
great deal of interest in whether incomes have risen among less-skilled single mothers.   
The official U.S. poverty data suggest unambiguous improvements in poverty 
among single-mother families, as Table 3 indicates.  The share of all families in poverty 
declines from 11.9 in 1992 (the end of the recession in the early 1990s) to 8.6 percent in 
2000, below the previous historic low of 8.8 percent in 1974.
25  Given the strong 
economy, this is perhaps a disappointingly small decline in poverty.  Poverty among 
single-mother families declines more rapidly however, from 35.4 percent in 1992 to 24.7 
percent in 2000, a new historic low.  Poverty rates among single mother families headed 
by blacks and Hispanics were also at historic lows in 2000.  This suggests that, at least in 
the short run, changes in social policy did not worsen the economic situation of poor 
households.  The decline in poverty is far less, however, than the reduction in public 
assistance caseloads.  As a result, the share of working poor in the U.S. population rose, 
as some women left public assistance for employment but remained poor.   
Unfortunately, U.S. poverty rates provide only partial information on well-being 
(Citro and Michael, 1995).
26  Table 4 provides information on poverty gaps among 
families with children between 1993 and 1999, showing how far average family income 
is below the poverty line among poor families.  Row one shows the poverty gap based 
only on pre-transfer income among families.  Row two includes social insurance benefits 
                                                           
25 All official poverty rate data can be found at www.census.gov. 
26 Alternative poverty calculations can be found in U.S. Department of Commerce (1999), with updated 
numbers for 1998 at www.census.gov/poverty/povmeas/expov.tabe.html.  These calculations also show a 
strong decline in poverty among female-headed families over the 1990s.   21
(Social Security, disability and workers compensation), row three adds means-tested 
benefits (cash and in-kind), and row four calculates poverty gaps based on total income 
net of taxes.  The bottom part of the table shows the percentage reduction in the poverty 
gap as the definition of income is sequentially expanded.  
Between 1993 and 1999 substantial increases in earnings resulted in a declining 
poverty gap when looking only at pre-transfer cash income.  With increases in earnings 
come reductions in means-tested benefits, however.  Social Insurance reduces the poverty 
gap by a relatively constant 16 to 18 percent over these years.  Means-tested benefits, 
however, reduce the poverty gap 44 percent in 1993, but only 34 percent in 1999, 
reflecting the declining caseloads.  Over time, the federal tax system expands to further 
reduce poverty gaps, largely because of the growth in the EITC.  The net result is a slight 
rise in poverty gaps based on after-tax income over the 1990s, from $1447 to $1524.  Of 
course, since fewer persons are in poverty by the end of this period, it is hard to state 
whether the net effect is to raise or lower well-being.  A more disadvantaged group may 
remain poor over this period, resulting in a rising poverty gap. 
Table 5 presents information on a set of tabulations recently completed by the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
27 which calculate the average income of female-
headed households by quintile.  The results in Table 5 indicate that incomes among 
women in the top 80 percent of the income distribution of female-headed families 
(quintiles 2 through 5) rose unambiguously over the 1990s, including increases post-
1996.  This is consistent with evidence from other surveys that do similar data tabulations 
(Primus, et. al., 1999; Haskins, 2001; Gabe, 2001, Jencks, Swingle, and Winship, 2001).   
                                                           
27 These data are currently unpublished, but available upon request from Wendell Primus.   22
There is other evidence that some group of disadvantaged women lost income in 
the mid-1990s.  Haskins (2001) discusses evidence of a rise in deep poverty (the number 
of persons at less than 50 percent of the poverty line) in the mid-1990s.  The very poorest 
quintile of single-mother families experienced an increase in income in the first half of 
the 1990s, but little overall income growth post-1996.  This is not surprising, as 
underlying calculations indicate that means-tested income among this population fell by 
more than $1500, while earnings rose by less than $1000.  In higher quintiles, earnings 
gains were much stronger than the loss in means-tested income.  Zedlewski, et. al. (2002) 
also document rises in deep poverty between 1996 and 1998 among families with 
children. 
Somewhat contrasting evidence comes from data on consumer expenditures, 
which shows increases in consumption spending through the 1990s, even among very 
low-income single mothers with children (Haskins, 2001; Meyer and Sullivan, 2001).  
Jencks, et. al., (2001) indicate that food-related problems declined between 1995 and 
1999 for single mothers as rapidly as among other poor groups.  In short, the available 
evidence suggests that most single mothers gained ground in the 1990s, but there is a 
group of the poorest single mother families who have made only minimal gains over the 
1990s and some at the very bottom who might have lost ground.  
All of these income calculations should be viewed with some skepticism.  First, a 
substantial minority of those leaving welfare appear to be unemployed at some later point 
(Brauner and Loprest, 1999).  We have little evidence on how these women are 
surviving, but the best guess is that they are relying more upon boyfriends or other family 
members for income.  While this may be a viable short-term strategy, over time such   23
arrangements may fall apart and are unlikely to provide long-term economic stability for 
either the women or their children. 
Second, few of these studies actually measure disposable income.  While the 
studies cited above take into account the EITC and some other non-cash transfers, they 
do not fully calculate tax rates on earners.  They typically impute EITC receipt and their 
data on housing, Food Stamps or medical assistance is not complete.  They provide little 
information on income sharing with other individuals or families.  Furthermore, none of 
these calculations take account of increased expenses associated with work, particularly 
out-of-pocket child care expenses.  There is a need for research that provides a more 
complete picture of the changes in the actual economic well-being of less-skilled single-
mother families and their children over the 1990s, in the midst of major policy and 
behavioral changes. 
 
IV.  Research and Evaluation Challenges 
  Estimating the effects of the program changes described above creates real 
evaluation challenges.  One must control effectively enough for all other environmental 
influences to produce a credible estimate of a policy effect.  This is particularly difficult 
in a world where many things are changing at the same time, as happened in the 1990s.  
  Past work evaluating the AFDC program tended to describe the welfare 
environment for an individual by controlling for state benefit levels and (occasionally) for 
effective state BRRs.  Since most eligibility rules were uniformly set by the federal 
government, state variation in benefit levels was the dominant feature describing welfare 
generosity and access across states.     24
  Post-1996, it is much more difficult to characterize the policy environment for 
each state.  State welfare policies vary along multiple program dimensions, and the 
precise nature of the bundle matters since different program components may interact 
with each other.  For instance, one may need to control for the interaction of BRRs and 
sanctions, rather than just controlling for each separately.  Not all of the program 
elements described above are easily coded, and there is little guidance in the research to 
date showing the most effective way to measure and code some of the newer policies like 
time limits, sanctions or diversion activities.  In some cases only a few states have 
adopted particular policies or combinations of policies.  For data sets with state level 
observations, this can make it difficult to estimate precise policy effects.   
  With individual-level data, it is much more difficult to identify the specific 
program rules facing any individual.  Data sets like the Current Population Survey 
provide no information on whether an individual is required to participate in a welfare-to-
work program, whether they have been sanctioned, how close they are to reaching their 
time limits, what type of subsidies for child care or other work supports they might be 
receiving from TANF dollars, or whether they receive EITC funds.  In short, most of our 
data sets are designed to collect information on cash welfare assistance, appropriate for 
the old world of AFDC but not very useful in the new world of TANF where cash public 
assistance levels are less and less descriptive of state welfare programs. 
  For all of these reasons, it has become much harder to study the impact of welfare 
programs or their specific components on individual behavior.  The complexity and 
diversity in state programs means that an increasing amount of analysis focuses on data 
from a single state, creating problems of comparability and generalizability. Closely   25
linked to this focus on single states, there has been a substantial increase in the use of 
administrative data to analyze welfare-related questions.  Administrative data typically 
provide more detailed information on the parameters of the welfare system that impact 
any individual, including their use of multiple programs, their work requirements, their 
accumulated timing of welfare receipt, and so on.   More and more researchers are 
linking information from multiple administrative data sets.  For instance, welfare receipt 
records might be linked with unemployment insurance records to determine quarterly 
earnings after leaving welfare. 
   Most researchers have tried to measure the direct effects of the enactment of 
waivers and the implementation of TANF.  This is complicated not only by the data 
problems mentioned above, but also by other evaluation difficulties. 
  First, waivers were not implemented by a random set of states.  States with higher 
unemployment rates were more likely to request major welfare waivers (Schoeni and 
Blank, 2000).  This means that waivers cannot be used as a simple “natural experiment” 
in which results in waiver states are compared with results in non-waiver states. 
  Second, the coincidence and the interaction of the economic expansion and the 
implementation of welfare reform creates problems.  The strong economic boom and the 
passage of PRWORA occur simultaneously and it is difficult to separately identify their 
causal effects.  This is even more true if the two events interact with each other.  For 
instance, states may have been able to change their cash public assistance programs to 
work-oriented support programs more quickly and more thoroughly because they did not 
have to worry about job availability issues.  Most people who could be placed in a job 
search assistance program were able to locate a job.  Conversely, the strong push that   26
increased the supply of less skilled women into the labor market may have changed the 
demand side of the labor market in some places, for these women and for other less 
skilled workers (Bartik, 2000).   For all of these reasons, separating economic effects 
from policy effects promises to be difficult in the mid-1990s.   
  Third, multiple policy changes were being implemented at the same time, and 
these policy changes almost surely interacted with each other in a reinforcing way.  The 
large increases in the EITC subsidies occurred just before welfare reform was passed and 
at the same time as minimum wage increases in the mid-1990s.  As noted above, child 
support subsidies were restructured at the same time as welfare was reformed.  This 
makes it difficult to separately identify individual policy effects.  For instance, Blank 
(2000) argues that it was the combined interaction between multiple policy changes and a 
booming economy that led to the unexpectedly large caseload declines and labor force 
participation increases. 
  Fourth, the implementation of state TANF programs is particularly difficult to 
evaluate because it occurred at about the same time in all states.  Within a nine-month 
period from September 1996 through July 1997, all states began implementing their new 
TANF plans.  This is in contrast to major state waivers, which were approved over a four 
year period in 27 states, allowing a researcher to identify the effects of these waivers 
from the differences in when they were implemented across states.    
  Finally, almost ignored in the economics literature, there is often a difference  
between enacted program rules and actual implementation practices.  This may be 
particularly true for a major program change that is being implemented quickly.  Because 
staff are not fully trained in the new systems or because staff may disagree with some of   27
the new program changes, what’s actually done “on the ground” could differ substantially 
from the formal description of state programs (Meyers, Glaser, and MacDonald, 1998; 
Gais, et. al., 2001). 
  A multiplicity of empirical approaches have been used to study the welfare policy 
changes of the 1990s.  Three of the most common are summarized here, with a brief 
discussion of their pros and cons.
28 
  Random Assignment Experiments.  For more than two decades, researchers have 
studied labor market interventions with random assignment experiments.  In these cases, 
an experimental group is randomly chosen from among those eligible for a program and 
this group receives the services and program benefits.  An alternative control group is 
refused entrance into the program and operates in an environment (presumably) 
unaffected by the program.  If randomization is done correctly, the only difference 
between the two groups should be that one group receives the program treatment and one 
does not.  That means that simple outcome differences between the groups can be used as 
a measure of program effects. 
  Experimental evaluation of welfare-to-work programs has occurred since the mid-
1980s and became quite sophisticated by the 1990s.  During the 1980s these experimental 
evaluations focused solely on welfare-to-work programs.  The use of waivers in the 
1990s allowed states to implement more extensive reforms involving other program 
changes beyond welfare-to-work efforts.  Because the Department of Health and Human 
Services required experimental evaluations of waiver programs, a body of results are now 
available from pre-1996 state programs analyzing the impact of more complex welfare 
                                                           
28 In addition to these three approaches, there is a great deal of more descriptive work, much of it involving 
the collection of new data, including a variety of ethnographic studies in particular neighborhoods.    28
reforms with multiple components – welfare-to-work training, time limits, sanctions, 
family caps, etc -- on AFDC receipt and earnings.
29   The federal mandate for 
experimental evaluations of waiver programs ended when TANF was implemented and 
there have been no experimental evaluations of TANF programs post-1996. 
  These experimental evaluations are viewed as highly credible, since they come as 
close to a controlled research environment as possible.  When experiments are 
appropriately designed, there is no better methodology available.  Indeed, the widespread 
acceptance of the positive results of welfare-to-work evaluations in the 1980s were a 
major reason why policymakers supported work-oriented welfare reform in the 1990s. 
  These experiments have limitations as a way to study the welfare reforms of the 
1990s, however.  First, when multiple program changes are occurring, it is difficult to 
study the separate effects of individual program changes in an experimental way.  Hence, 
the policy implications of experimental results were more interpretable in narrowly 
implemented welfare-to-work programs (which changed only one or two program 
parameters) than in broad waiver programs (which typically involved multiple program 
changes).  For instance, it is not possible to separately identify the effect of time limits 
from other welfare-to-work components in existing experimental evaluations from the 
early 1990s; the experimental results identify the aggregate effect of all program changes 
together rather than the specific effect of each individual program change.  Similarly, it is 
not possible to use experimental evaluations to study the impact of a legislative change 
(such as TANF) where multiple changes are implemented throughout the state at the 
same time. 
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research, and Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001) for a summary of some of the key 1990s research.   29
  Second, experiments should be designed so that the program effects cannot 
influence the control group.  With all of the simultaneous policy changes occurring in the 
1990s, however, it was hard to prevent some contamination.  Word circulated among 
welfare recipients – including the control group – about mandatory work requirements or 
upcoming time limits.  This might lead the control group to respond to these rumors, even 
though they were formally unaffected by the changes. 
  Third, experimental studies are expensive and time-intensive.  They almost 
always require collecting additional survey data, both at baseline (when the control and 
experimental groups are defined) and at multiple follow-up study points.  Because their 
implementation takes skill and often requires some administrative reorganization within 
welfare programs to separate the control and experimental groups, they put additional 
demands on administrators and front-line workers.  In the midst of all the other changes 
occurring in welfare offices, few states wanted to invest either the funds or the time 
necessary for experimental evaluations over the late 1990s.
30  The locations that did 
participate in earlier experimental evaluations during the 1990s are not a random sample 
of all states or welfare offices.  For instance, we have a number of excellent evaluations 
done in north midwestern states and fewer evaluations done in the traditional “deep 
south” states.  This can call into question the generalizability of the experimental 
evidence. 
Fourth, these experimental studies are not well-designed to study “entry effects.”  
An experimental program may not induce the same discouraging effect on welfare usage 
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many governors pointed to the declines in caseloads and the implementation of welfare reform as a major 
success.  This could have made them more reluctant to authorize serious evaluations that might reduce their 
ability to garner political credit from these changes.   30
that might result from a permanent welfare reform, hence caseload change may be 
underestimated.  Even if some families are discouraged by the experiment from ever 
applying for welfare at all, this effect is typically not measured in most experiments.
31 
  For all of these reasons, the experimental evidence on the effects of welfare 
reform is highly useful where it looks at the impact of specific program components in 
particular types of welfare programs.  But the experimental evidence tells us relatively 
little about the overall effects of TANF implementation in states in the mid-1990s.  
  Leavers’ Studies.  A substantial amount of research time and money has been 
devoted to following persons as they left welfare in recent years.  A number of 
organizations and individuals launched so-called “leavers’ studies” soon after the 
implementation of the 1996 legislation.  The primary intent was to analyze the behavior 
and well-being of those who lose welfare benefits (either voluntarily or involuntarily) in 
the post-reform era. 
  Leavers’ studies answer a very specific policy question, namely, “How are people 
faring who used to receive public assistance but are no longer on the rolls?”  The interest 
in this question has been strong, particularly as caseloads have declined so precipitously 
in most states.   
  Most of these studies use a combination of administrative data and new survey 
data.  Persons on welfare at a specific point in time are tracked and surveyed at some later 
point, to ask about their employment, family, and income situation.  This survey 
information may be combined with other administrative data to investigate program 
receipt of Food Stamps, Medicaid, or other support programs, to measure recidivism 
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seems less relevant to the welfare reforms of the 1990s, which tended to focus on moving people directly   31
(return to cash public assistance), or to verify employment using Unemployment 
Insurance program data on earnings and employment.   These studies can provide quite 
detailed information on the behavior of ex-welfare recipients. 
  Like experimental evaluations, leavers’ studies can be complex, costly, and time-
consuming.  It is often difficult to locate and survey ex-welfare recipients, and a number 
of not-very-credible leavers’ studies have low (and presumably quite selective) response 
rates.  Working with administrative records, particularly records across multiple 
programs, requires matching individual identifiers and dealing with complex data 
problems.  As a result, the quality of leavers’ studies varies greatly.  Since most leavers’ 
studies are state-specific, it is often difficult to compare them as different researchers 
focus on different outcomes or use different methodologies in different states. 
  The biggest limitation to leavers’ studies is that they provide very little 
information about policy effects.  Unlike an experimental evaluation, it is impossible to 
separate those who would have left welfare even under AFDC from those additional 
leavers due to the new welfare program design.  This means leavers’ studies tell us 
almost nothing about the effects of new programs.
32   
Furthermore, leavers’ studies by design focus on a limited population--those who 
were once on welfare.  Some studies ignore those who remain on welfare longer, a group 
of some concern.  None of these leavers’ studies say anything about those who might 
have come onto AFDC pre-1996 but who chose not to come onto TANF post-1996.  
Evidence suggests that both entry into welfare has fallen and exits from welfare have 
                                                                                                                                                                             
into jobs; in contrast, the reforms of the 1980s often had substantial education and training components.  
32 An exception is Cancian, et. al. (2002), who compare pre-reform leavers with post-reform leavers in the 
state of Wisconsin.  While this is a superior methodology, even these estimates are contaminated by other 
changes (such as the booming economy) which occur at the same time as reform.   32
risen (Mueser, et. al., 2000).  To the extent that those who are diverted from receiving 
welfare are differently selected from those who come on but leave faster, the leavers’ 
studies cannot be interpreted as evidence on the general well-being of persons affected by 
welfare reform.  One might expect leavers to be somewhat less employable and more 
disadvantaged than those who have options that allow them to choose not to enter welfare 
in the first place. 
In short, leavers’ studies provide little information about the overall effects of 
welfare reform.  At best they tell us something descriptive about how a specific 
population of ex-welfare recipients is faring, but it is difficult to interpret anything causal 
about policy (or any other explanatory variable) from these studies. 
Econometric evaluations.  A growing body of literature uses a combination of 
national and administrative data to study the impact of policies.  Typically, these studies 
use data on a key dependent variable – such as caseloads or labor force participation -- 
from multiple years and regress it against controls for economic factors and policy 
factors.  Some studies also include controls for demographics and political changes.   
Much of this work is based on state panel data.  For instance, state caseload data might be 
regressed against state unemployment rates, state AFDC/TANF benefit levels, and 
dummy variables that signal the implementation of a state waiver.  Alternatively, some of 
this research utilizes individual data on welfare participation or work behavior for 
multiple years.   
A typical regression equation based on state panel data is as follows: 
st st st t s st X P Y ε γ δ β α + + + + = ) 1 ( .   33
where Yst is the dependent variable (say AFDC/TANF caseloads) in state s in year t.  The 
vector αs represents the set of estimated state fixed effects for all s states, βt represents a 
set of year fixed effects for all t years (sometimes there are also state-specific time trends 
included), Pst is a set of policy-specific parameters and δ is its related coefficient vector, 
while Xst is a set of all other included variables with γ its related coefficient vector.   Xst 
typically includes state unemployment rates and may include other state economic and 
demographic variables.  Equation (1) is usually estimated with a weighted least squares 
estimation procedure, with weights based on state population.
33 
Policy variables are typically represented as dummy variables that equal zero 
prior to the implementation of a specific policy (a waiver or a TANF program), and equal 
1 in each year thereafter.
34  Hence, the policy coefficients measure the average change in 
Y after the policy change, controlling for all other variables.  The state effects remove 
long-term state-specific differences and allow one to interpret the coefficients as the 
effect of changes in the independent variables over time within a given state.   The year 
effects remove any common changes occurring in all states in the same year (and hence 
remove the effects of policies that are implemented everywhere at once, such as an EITC 
change or a minimum wage change). 
Identifying the true effects of policy on the dependent variable Y requires several 
things:  First, policies must be accurately and completely coded; second, there must be a 
way to identify the policy effects separately from the other variables; and third, there 
must be no omitted variables correlated with the policy changes to bias the policy 
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the variables of interest (policy differences within and across states) vary only at the state level.  In a few 
cases, authors interact policies with individual-level characteristics, in which case utilizing individual-level 
data is a necessity.   34
coefficients.  Most researchers use relatively sparse specifications, hoping that state and 
year fixed effects and state-year time trends will control for the large number of omitted 
variables that inevitably haunt these econometric exercises.   
As discussed below, most of this work has focused on AFDC/TANF receipt, 
looking at caseload changes over time as the dependent variable.  Some papers look also 
at changes in labor force participation over time, and a few papers use earnings, income, 
poverty, fertility or marriage rates as the dependent variable.   
These econometric studies confront a variety of problems.  First, identifying the 
policy effects can be a problem.  The effects of welfare waivers are reasonably well 
identified, since different states adopted these waivers at different points in time.  The 
effects of TANF implementation are much less well-identified.  As noted above, virtually 
all states implement TANF at about the same point in time.  Most papers try to use the 
differences in timing over 1996-97 to identify an effect, but the standard errors of  these 
estimates are high.
35  Some papers try to identify effects by combining waivers and 
TANF, coding a dummy variable that equals one if a state has a major waiver in effect or 
if it has adopted a TANF program.  This has the odd effect of forcing waivers and TANF 
programs to have identical effects, almost surely not justified given how much more 
extensive were the changes involved with state TANF plans.   
Even if identification were easier, this research merely estimates the aggregate 
effect of these changes, without differentiating between the very different set of waiver or 
TANF program components adopted by different states.  Hence, some researchers have 
                                                                                                                                                                             
34 In the year the policy is enacted, the dummy variable is typically equal to the fraction of months that the 
policy is in effect.   35
tried to code the adoption of specific program components rather than the adoption of a 
single policy change.
36  Unfortunately, the identification problems with this approach are 
severe.  As noted above, it is not clear how to code some policy changes (and we have 
only limited information post-1996 on what specific states are doing in certain policy 
areas).  Furthermore, some individual policies are adopted by so few states (and only in 
the few years post-1996) that there is not enough information to estimate a reliable 
coefficient.   The result is that much of the econometric literature focusing on individual 
policy components finds insignificant or even perverse coefficients. 
Finally, there have been substantial specification arguments in this literature.  
Most papers have chosen to utilize a simple panel data framework with fixed effects, 
perhaps including lags on a few key variables (like unemployment rates).  A few papers, 
however, have chosen more complex specifications, including lagged dependent 
variables, a greater number of lags on key independent variables, and/or more extensive 
fixed effects.  These choices matter because the more complex specifications typically 
find smaller or less significant policy effects.  Those who like these latter papers tend to 
argue that the more complex specifications better mirror reality and are more reliable.  
Those who find these latter papers less persuasive (including myself) tend to argue that 
they are overspecified, with extensive lag structures that leave little scope for measuring 
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to estimate TANF effects based on a difference-in-difference estimates, pre- and post-1996 and between 
more and less educated women. 
36 Rather than controlling for the implementation of waivers, for instance, this could mean controlling for 
the type of sanctions approved in the waiver, the presence and length of time limits, the implementation of 
a family cap, or the nature of the work mandates in the state.   36
policy effects based on simple dummy variables.  In addition, the combination of a 
lagged dependent variable with state fixed effects produces inconsistent estimates.
37   
A seminal contribution to this specification argument was provided by Klerman 
and Haider (2001), who point out that there is no clear theoretical justification provided 
for any of the specifications used in earlier papers.  They note that the stock of welfare 
cases is the result of flows into and out of welfare.  They model the dynamic process of 
entering and leaving welfare and derive an estimable model of aggregate caseload change 
from this.  They show that even if the entry rate and the continuation rate are functions 
only of contemporaneous economic conditions, per capita caseloads will be a non-linear 
function of lagged economic conditions equal to the longest period individuals are on aid.  
Hence, only particular lagged specifications are correct.  They also indicate the 
conditions under which including a lagged dependent variable is appropriate. 
Klerman and Haider’s work provides a more believable and persuasive 
specification than earlier papers, and suggests that much of the other research estimating 
the determinants of per capita caseload levels has been misspecified.  Klerman and 
Haider prefer a model which estimates welfare entry and exit flows, rather than net 
caseload levels.  Unfortunately, estimating this specification requires flow data, which 
does not appear to be reliably available at the national level.  (Klerman and Haider 
estimate their model on California data only, where they believe they have reliable data.  
This makes it hard to generalize their results and compare them to other work.)  Klerman 
and Haider’s results from this co-called “stock-flow model” are closer to those of the 
simpler specifications in the role that it ascribes to the economy over the 1990s. 
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(2001b).  For a more positive reading of these results, see Bell (2001) or Ziliak (2002).  Moffitt   37
  Ultimately, econometric models – however limited – will probably provide the 
best evidence we are likely to have available on the overall effects of welfare reform.  
Such models are almost surely less reliable in providing evidence on individual program 
components; when available, experimental evidence on specific program changes is 
probably more believable.  Future research should focus on better ways of utilizing 
econometrics to identify individual welfare program components.   
For instance, Grogger (2000, 2002, forthcoming) takes a clever approach with 
time limits.  He notes that families with young children should be more affected by time 
limits than families with older children (since families with young children have a longer 
period of future potential welfare eligibility).  Hence, he interacts state time limit 
information with information on the ages of children in a household, and finds 
substantially larger effects among families with younger children, as hypothesized.  
Similar creativity in teasing out the effects of other specific program components would 
be useful. 
  The remainder of this paper summarizes the research findings from papers that 
use the above methodological approaches.  I organize this review by the dependent 
variable in the paper. 
 
V. Caseloads 
The most voluminous literature on welfare reform in the past decade has focused 
on caseload changes.  Interestingly, prior to the mid-1990s, there was virtually no 
published literature in economics journals looking at movements in caseloads over time,
38 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(forthcoming) also provides a summary of this literature. 
38 An exception is Moffitt (1987).     38
but the number of more recent articles is growing rapidly.  The primary interest in this 
research literature is to explore the steep caseload decline that started in the mid-1990s, 
with particular attention to separating out the effects of economy from policy. 
Almost all of the literature on caseloads fits into the third methodology described 
above, and utilizes regression analysis on some sort of panel data over time.  (Some 
evidence from experimental studies on the impact of specific program choices on welfare 
usage is discussed in Section VIII below.)  Different papers focus on different variables, 
and the discussion below focuses sequentially on the effects of economic variables and of 
aggregate policy variables on caseloads.  I briefly discuss the (few) papers which focus 
on caseload flows rather than caseload levels, followed by a discussion of research that 
distinquishes the effects of specific policy components on caseloads.  I close this section 
with a short discussion of the literature on food stamp caseloads. 
Table 6 provides a list of the papers to date that use regression analysis to 
investigate the effects of welfare reform during the 1990s, indicating the dependent 
variable, data source, primary included variables, and a few key conclusions.   In most of 
these papers, caseloads are the dependent variable, although a few of them (discussed 
below) look at employment, income, and family structure changes as well.   Part A of 
Table 6 lists the papers using data prior to the implementation of TANF, which primarily 
focus on the effects of state waivers.  As we discuss below, some of these papers focus on 
the implementation of any waiver, while others try to differentiate between the policy 
components in different waivers.  Part B lists the papers that utilize data post-TANF and   39
that estimate the effects of TANF as well as waivers.  Part C lists the papers that use flow 
data on exits from or entries onto welfare, rather than stock data on caseloads.
39 
Aggregate Caseloads and the Economy.  The majority of papers utilize annual 
state panel data, based on administrative records, to study movements in total 
AFDC/TANF caseloads, using some variant of equation (1).  The typical economic 
variable is the state unemployment rate, although a few papers use state income or wage 
information as well.  This is due to data convenience as much as anything else -- state 
unemployment rates are one of the few readily available annual state-level economic 
variables.  Given the sensitivity of less-skilled workers to movements in unemployment 
(Hoynes, 2000), this is often assumed to be reasonable characterization of the economic 
environment.
40  
The majority of papers find relatively similar effects of unemployment on 
caseloads, not surprising since these papers tend to use similar methodologies and data 
sets.  For instance, Council of Economic Advisers (1997, 1999), Levine and Whitmore 
(1998), Wallace and Blank (1999), and Blank (2001a) all find that a 1-point rise in 
unemployment tends to increase caseloads by about 5 to 7 percent.  Blank (2001a) 
suggests that these effects are larger for the small part of the caseload composed of 
married couples than among single mothers. 
  Most of these papers attempt to see how much of the caseload change over the 
mid-1990s can be ascribed to economic changes.  For instance, Council of Economic 
Advisers (1999) indicates that changes in unemployment explain 26 to 35 percent of the 
                                                           
39 I do not include papers based on data from one state only in Table 6.  A number of good state-specific 
research exists, such as MaCurdy, Mancuso, and O’Brien-Strain (2002) for California.  I also omit studies 
that are based on a single cross-section rather than panel data (such as Mead, 2000.)   40
caseload change in 1993-96, but only 8 to 10 percent of the caseload change in 1996-98.  
These estimates range widely across studies, and are highly affected by the years over 
which they are estimated and by the specification.  Specifications utilizing lagged 
dependent variables and/or first differences (Ziliak, et. al., 2000; Figlio and Ziliak, 1999) 
tend to find larger effects due to economic changes.
41 
  It also appears that the responsiveness of caseloads to unemployment has 
increased over time (Moffitt, 1999a; Council of Economic Advisers, 1999).  This means 
that studies based on more recent and shorter panels (such as Ziliak, et. al., 2000) are 
more likely to find larger unemployment effects.  While the reasons for this change are 
unclear, it is consistent with a welfare system that is doing more and more to emphasize 
work.  This reduces the dependence of welfare recipients on cash benefits, and increases 
their dependence upon job availability.
42 
  Several of the papers that utilize data post-1996 and compare the TANF era with 
the AFDC era indicate that unemployment effects on caseloads are smaller post-1996 
than pre-1996 (Council of Economic Advisers, 1999; Wallace and Blank, 1999; Schoeni 
and Blank, 2000; O’Neill and Hill, 2001).  Post-1996, public assistance programs had a 
harder edge and put more attention into enforcing time limits, sanctions, and diversion 
policies. Given this policy environment, it may not be surprising that the economy 
mattered less to caseload changes during this time.  Alternatively, the very strong 
economy of the late 1990s might have been expected to have a greater effect than the 
more sluggish economy of the early 1990s, in which case this is a surprising finding. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
40 This assumption is typically made without real evidence.  As discussed below, other economic variables 
also appear to be important over the past two decades in explaining caseloads.  
41 Klerman and Haider (2001) indicate that these specifications should bias the economic effects upward.   41
  A few studies have gone beyond attention to state unemployment rates and 
utilized a richer set of economic variables.  Several studies include information on state-
specific minimum wages (Council of Economic Advisers, 1999; Grogger, 2000), on 
employment/population ratios (Ziliak, et. al, 2000) or on state income levels (Schoeni and 
Blank, 2000).  Several studies have tried to characterize the shifts in relative wages and in 
industry mix that occur over the 1980s and 1990s.  Blank (2001a) calculates state-specific 
average wage levels as well as 50
th percentile/10
th percentile wage level ratios within 
each state and year.  Bartik and Eberts (1999) utilize data on the education requirements, 
wage premiums, and low-wage employment implied by the industry mix in each state and 
year.  In most cases, these additional variables are significant and suggest that more than 
the unemployment rate matters in affecting caseloads.  Blank (2001a), however, indicates 
that the estimated unemployment effect is relatively unchanged by the inclusion of 
demographic or political variables.   
  Virtually all research agrees that state economies had a significant effect on 
caseloads, and that caseloads rise in bad economic times and decline in good times.  Most 
of the research suggests, however, that economic changes alone cannot explain the 
majority of caseload movements over the 1990s; policy variables also matter. 
Aggregate Caseloads and Overall Policy Effects.  Policy shifts are typically 
characterized by dummy variables that “turn on” when a policy is implemented in the 
state.  Early papers focused particularly on the effects of state waivers.  More recent 
papers have also tried to investigate the impact of TANF implementation.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
42 Bartik and Eberts (1999) suggest this might be due to declining demand for less skilled labor, which 
could make joblessness increasingly difficult to escape for low-wage workers.   42
identification problems discussed in the previous section make the latter particularly 
difficult to estimate. 
  Most of the literature finds that state waivers implemented in the first half of the 
1990s had a significant and negative effect on caseloads.
43   For instance, one of the 
earliest studies finds that the implementation of major statewide waivers explains about 
13 to 31 percent of state caseload change between 1993 and 1996 (Council of Economic 
Advisers, 1997).  While the magnitude of impact varies somewhat across studies, similar 
results are found in Levine and Whitmore (1998), Wallace and Blank (1999), and Blank 
(2001a).  Moffitt (1999a) and Schoeni and Blank (2000) use somewhat different data than 
other studies, aggregating individual data into state-year observations on AFDC 
participation by women’s age and education level.  Both of these papers also find 
significant negative waiver effects on AFDC participation, with particularly strong 
effects among less educated women, consistent with the expected impact of welfare 
reform. 
  Fewer studies have looked at the impact of TANF implementation (Part B of 
Table 6).  Council of Economic Advisers (1999) and Schoeni and Blank (2000) both 
indicate that TANF appears to have a larger effect on caseloads than did waivers.
44  This 
is consistent with the evidence cited above that shows that economic factors had smaller 
effects post-TANF, suggesting that the policy changes of the mid-1990s were a major 
cause of declining caseloads.   
                                                           
43 As discussed above, these waivers were not randomly implemented across states.  Once one controls for 
differences in state unemployment rates, non-waiver states and waiver states show similar caseload trends 
prior to the implementation of waivers (Schoeni and Blank, 2000) 
44 Wallace and Blank (1999) and Grogger (2000) find TANF effects that are similar in magnitude to 
waivers, but both papers only have data through 1998.  This is before the full effects of state TANF 
programs might have been felt.   43
  A few studies find almost no effects of policy, although most of these are 
focusing on the waiver period and not the post-TANF period (Ziliak, et. al., 2000; Figlio 
and Ziliak, 1999).  These studies, as discussed above, tend to use more complex 
specifications.  The shorter time period in Ziliak, et. al. (2000) also makes it more 
difficult to separately identify policy and economy effects.  Other specification issues 
matter as well, including the choice of fixed effects.  For instance, Schiller (1999) 
includes no fixed effects and (not surprisingly) finds stronger state policy-related effects.  
O’Neill and Hill (2001) do not include year fixed effects and as a result their estimated 
coefficient on the TANF dummy variable over the late 1990s is much larger than in other 
studies.  
  Despite evaluation and methodological problems, the bulk of the research 
literature suggests that the policy changes over the 1990s were important to the rapid  
caseload decline.  This evidence remains unsatisfying, however, for a variety of reasons.  
First, most of these papers focus on aggregate policy changes (the adoption of a major 
state waiver or the implementation of a TANF plan) rather than on specific policy 
components.  For instance, some aspects of these waivers (time limits and stricter 
sanctions) might have been expected to reduce caseloads.  Other aspects (lower benefit 
reduction rates) might have increased caseloads.  I discuss the efforts to characterize and 
measure the impact of policy specifics below. 
  Second, it remains very difficult in any of this literature to separate economic and 
policy effects, given the extent to which these were interacting with each other over the 
late 1990s.  The combination of extremely strong economic growth with rapid policy 
change means that both effects were reinforcing each other.   44
  Third, while these papers focus on welfare-related policies, they are less useful in 
measuring the additional impacts of other policy changes over this time period.  Because 
of the nature of the models (typically including year fixed effects) the impact of changes 
in the EITC or minimum wage on caseloads are difficult to evaluate.  No one has yet put 
together the appropriate data to measure the impacts of changes in child support policy, 
child care subsidies, or health insurance.  To the extent that these other changes are 
interacting with the measured policies over time, estimates of the measured policies may 
be biased up or down. 
  While there remains a very strong interest in the question “what has been the 
effect of the policy changes of the 1990s on caseloads (and other variables as well)?” it 
remains a difficult question to answer in an entirely credible manner.  Future research in 
this area, with better data or better identification strategies, will be received with interest. 
Caseload Entry and Exits.  Aggregate caseload changes are the result of an 
underlying dynamic process in which individuals are choosing to enter welfare and 
choosing how long to stay on it.  In other areas, looking at these underlying dynamic 
processes has produced new insights about net changes.
45  A few papers, listed in Table 
6, part C, have tried to investigate the underlying flows in and out of public assistance. 
This is hard to do because there does not exist good national flow data on 
AFDC/TANF entry and exit.  While states have reported welfare entries and exits for 
many years, this data has severe problems.  It is inconsistently reported across states 
(states define entries and exits differently) and some entries and exits appear not to be 
reported.  For instance, if one aggregates entries and exits over the 1980s and 1990s in 
                                                           
45 For instance, the literature on employment and unemployment has benefited by looking at flows in and 
out of the labor market and in and out of employment.   45
many states, there is little evidence of the significant rise in caseloads that is visible in the 
aggregate caseload data, suggesting either that entries are consistently undercounted or 
exits are overcounted.
46 
  Klerman and Haider (2001) provide a model of dynamic flows in and out of 
welfare, and relate them to the net caseload.  As discussed above, they also critique 
previous econometric estimates as misspecified, based on their model.  They utilize 
county-level entry and exit data from the state of California only, which they believe to 
be accurate, to estimate the determinants of entry and exit.  Their results on the role of 
unemployment in caseload changes based on flow models are quite similar to those 
estimated in much of the literature using stock models, and indicate that the economy 
accounts for less than half of the caseload change in the mid-1990s. 
  Mueser, et. al. (2000) take a somewhat similar approach.  They use administrative 
data on welfare recipients from five major metropolitan areas to create their own entry 
and exit rate calculations.  Using data over a number of years in the mid-1990s, they 
estimate that about two-thirds of the decline in welfare is due to higher exits from 
welfare, while about one-third is due to lower entry.  Consistent with the literature on 
aggregate caseloads, both state economic conditions and policy changes affect welfare 
exits.  Welfare entry appears less affected by the economy. 
  Finally, Hofferth, Stanhope and Harris (2001) estimate the probability of exiting 
welfare using longitudinal data from the PSID between 1989 and 1996.   Although the 
time period is quite short (particularly to measure the impact of policy changes that 
                                                           
46 Discussions with staffers at HHS suggest that the primary problem is likely to be that entries are 
undercounted.  In particular, in many states a woman who has recently been on welfare and who returns to 
the rolls appears not to be counted among the new entrants.     46
largely occurred in 1994 and 1995) they find significant effects of waivers, particularly 
on the probability of exiting AFDC to work.
47 
  Further work focusing on the underlying dynamics of caseload changes would be 
useful.  This will require the creation of new and better flow data.  In particular, it would 
be highly interesting to be able to estimate the impact of specific policy choices on entry 
and exit rates within states.  
The Effects of Policy Components.  A number of the econometric investigations of 
caseload changes attempt to measure the impact of specific policy components.  That is, 
these studies go beyond simple dummy variables that code the implementation of any 
waiver or any TANF plan and try to code the specific nature of the policy change.  
Because the available data on state policies is limited, these studies typically limit 
themselves to looking at 6 or 7 specific policies.
48  For instance, one might code when a 
state enacted time limits (some states received waivers to do this, some states enacted 
them as part of their TANF plan, some states have no time limits but have declared they 
will continue funding families out of state funds after 60 months).    
  On the one hand, this literature goes inside the “black box” of policy changes and 
does not treat “welfare reform” as a single variable.  On the other hand, efforts to analyze 
the effects of specific policies have at least two major problems.  First, only a partial set 
of policies are typically analyzed.  For instance, if states that implement lower benefit 
                                                           
47 This paper utilizes relatively simple duration models.  A companion paper (2002) looks at recidivism 
(returns to AFDC) among AFDC leavers.  But given the short time frame in which to observe the effects of 
policies enacted in 1994-95 on recidivism, it is not surprising that there are few significant effects estimated 
for waivers. 
48 Most typically, policy coding includes the implementation of time limits, a family cap, benefit reduction 
rates, age-of-child work exemptions, the timing of work requirements, sanctions and benefit reduction 
rates.  Not included in any of these studies is information on diversion policies, the nature of job-
preparation activities, or the availability of child care subsidies or other work supports.  Of course if the   47
reduction rates also provide more generous child support to those who go to work, then 
including one policy (BRRs) without the other (child support supplements) will produce a 
biased estimate.  An example is found in Kaushal and Kaestner (2001) whose only policy 
variables are measures of time limits and family caps.  This has the effect of attributing 
all of the effects of welfare reform to these two variables.  Second, the number of states 
that have implemented specific policies is very limited in many of these studies.  Many 
studies use data only through 1996, which allows them to code the policy specifics of 
waivers only.   Few enough states received waivers for specific policies that there is a 
fundamental lack of identification in many of these studies.  Evidence of this is seen in 
the regular occurance of perverse signs on some of these policy variables.
49  
  Among the studies that look at policy specific effects are CEA (1997, 1999), 
Ziliak, et. al. (2000), Moffitt (1999), Schiller (1999), and Kaushal and Kaestner (2001).  
(For more information on these studies, see Table 6.)  It is hard to produce a summary set 
of conclusions for this work.  With different specifications and slightly different data 
periods, different studies get different results on quite similar variables.  Not all of these 
results make sense, for instance, CEA (1999) finds that family caps increase caseloads; 
Ziliak, et. al. (2000) finds that strong work incentives increase caseloads.  It is difficult to 
draw strong conclusions about the impact of specific policies from this literature. 
  Three papers are somewhat more persuasive.  Grogger (2000) notes that families 
with younger children should be more affected by time limits, since they are more likely 
to be constrained by such limits.  He interacts the adoption of state time limits with age of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
implementation of these other (nonincluded) policies are correlated with the implementation of some of the 
included policies, this can bias the measured effects. 
49 Most of the specific variables also end up being insignificant in most of the estimates.  Of course, this is 
consistent with a lack of identification, but it is also consistent with a lack of policy effects.   48
youngest child in the family and finds consistently greater and more negative effects of 
time limits on families with younger children.   He estimates that 12 percent of the 
decline in welfare caseloads in the mid 1990s might be due to time limits.  Even this 
paper, however, should be read with some skepticism since there are omitted policies that 
might be correlated with time limits.  Grogger (forthcoming) extends this work, showing 
that time limits also increased work more among women with young children and 
Grogger (2002) indicates the effect occurs in other data sets. 
  Hofferth, Stanhope, and Harris (2001) investigate the effects of specific waiver  
policies, using data from 1989-96 from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics to look at 
welfare exits.  While their results on the determinants of “any exit from welfare” result in 
largely insignificant coefficients on specific policies, their results on the determinants of 
“exit from welfare that results in work” are more conclusive.  They find that stricter work 
requirements and fewer exemptions for mothers with young children are positively 
correlated with welfare-to-work exits, while lower benefit reduction rates are negatively 
correlated.  The lack of a complete set of welfare-related policies causes omitted variable 
problems with this study as well. 
  There is still much room for further research that uncovers the effects of specific 
policies through controlled estimation techniques.  It would be helpful to have a fuller 
specification of state policies, longer time periods to observe the full effect of these 
policies (especially in the post-TANF era), variation in policy within states over time to 
provide stronger identification of effects, and better ways to identify the effects of these 
policies on the groups which they most impact.  Experimental evidence on the effect of a 
few specific policy choices is discussed in Section VIII below.   49
Food Stamp Caseloads.  While most of the literature has focused on 
AFDC/TANF caseloads, one might also be concerned about access to other means-tested 
programs as well.  As women leave cash public assistance programs for work, they 
should maintain their Food Stamp eligibility if their overall incomes remain low.  Hence, 
rapid declines in Food Stamp caseloads in the mid 1990s were viewed with concern by 
many.   
  Food Stamp caseloads have tracked AFDC caseloads quite closely since the late 
1970s.  This is not surprisingly, since over 80 percent of AFDC recipients also received 
Food Stamps (U.S. House of Representatives, 2000, Table 15-3).  Although Food Stamps 
have been historically available to all low-income families and individuals, take-up rates 
have been quite low among the non-elderly, non-AFDC population.
50  This suggests the 
historical importance of AFDC as a “gateway” program into Food Stamps. 
  Like AFDC, Food Stamp caseloads increased from 1990-94, peaked in 1994, and 
then began to decline rapidly.  They fell 37.5 percent from 1994-2000.  While their rate 
of decline was similar to the decline in AFDC/TANF in the 1994-98 period, it began to 
slow and Food Stamps fell much less in 1998-2000 than did TANF caseloads.   
  Despite the expectation that many families should maintain Food Stamp 
eligibility, Zedlewski (2001) indicates that almost two-thirds of welfare leavers leave 
Food Stamps as well.  Even among very low income families leaving welfare (i.e., those 
whose income is below 50 percent of the poverty line), only about half continue to 
receive Food Stamps although all of these families should still be eligible.  Schirm (2001) 
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indicates that there has been a clear decline in Food Stamp take-up rates among eligibles, 
from 71 percent in 1994 to 59 percent in 1998.
51  
  There have been few econometric studies of Food Stamp declines.  Wallace and 
Blank (1999) estimate Food Stamp caseload determinants, using a model identical to that 
which they use with AFDC/TANF determinants.  They find Food Stamp caseloads are 
slightly more responsive to economic cycles (a one-point rise in the unemployment rate 
results in a 6-7 percent increase in Food Stamp caseloads).  Waivers appear to have a 
significant negative effect on Food Stamp caseloads, although there are typically few 
provisions in these waivers directly related to Food Stamps.  Similar results are found in 
Wilde, et. al. (2000), who look at transitions on and off Food Stamps in the early 1990s 
and find strong economic responsiveness and an effect of state welfare waivers.  Currie 
and Grogger (2001) use post-1996 data and indicate that waivers and TANF both 
decreased the food stamp caseload.  Figlio, Gundersen, and Ziliak (2000) find significant 
cyclicality in the Food Stamp caseload.  As with related work on cash benefits, once they 
include a lagged dependent variable and various lags in other variables, they find much 
smaller effects of policy changes. 
  More work indicating how Food Stamp caseloads are changing within different 
populations can be important.  The 1996 legislation limited Food Stamp eligibility among 
able-bodied persons without children and the effect of these restrictions would be 
interesting to study.  Similarly, there has been a sharp decline in Food Stamp use among 
                                                           
51 This raises a variety of policy-related issues about how families learn of their Food Stamp eligibility and 
how they maintain benefits while working.  See Greenstein and Guyer (2001) for a review of these issues.    51
legal immigrant families and their children since the 1996 legislation eliminated their 
eligibility.  The effects of this change could also be studied.
52  
 
VI.  Labor Force Participation 
Declining caseloads are a mixed indicator.  They indicate less receipt of cash 
assistance, which is good for those concerned with government budgets but may be bad 
from the viewpoint of individual well-being.  The thrust of the 1990s reforms was to 
increase work and it is important to explore not just whether policies caused women to 
leave welfare, but also whether these same policies helped women enter the labor force 
and replace their public assistance income with earnings.   
The leavers’ studies focus on employment behavior among ex-welfare recipients.  
As noted above, this is only a subgroup of those affected by welfare reform (others 
choose never to come onto welfare as a result of the reforms).  But labor market 
opportunities for this group have received substantial public attention.  The evidence 
suggests that close to two-thirds of welfare leavers are working at a future point in time.
53  
An even higher share held at least one job since leaving welfare.  Martinson (2000) notes 
that only 20 percent of leavers appear to never work in a four year follow-up of work 
programs in six sites.  In short, most leavers find jobs, although jobs and jobholding may 
be unstable, so that leavers may not work continuously.
54   
                                                           
52 Borjas (2001b) has a recent paper on this. 
53 Cancian, et. al. (1999) uses the two-thirds number to summarize existing leavers studies.  Loprest (2001) 
indicates 61 to 64 percent are working at a survey point within two years of leaving welfare.  Moffitt and 
Roff (2000) cite 63 percent working in studies of three major metropolitan areas.  Devere (2001) indicates 
55 to 64 percent are working within 3 months of leaving welfare, based on a review of state leavers studies. 
54 A growing body of research has focussed on the effects of personal barriers – such as health problems, 
substance abuse problems, low skills, or domestic violence – on work, indicating that mothers with 
multiple barriers work less (Danziger, et. al., 2000; Zedlewski and Loprest, 2001).   52
Wages among leavers vary by study, but typically range between $5.50 and $8.50 
per hour among those who are working.
55  Most leavers appear to have no more than two 
spells of employment inside 4 years (Martinson, 2000), which does suggest job churning 
is not extensive.  Holzer, Stoll, and Wissoker (2001) indicate that employers rate welfare 
recipients as performing as well or better than other employees. 
While descriptively interesting, these studies raise a variety of questions.  First, 
how much did policy influence labor market changes?  Second, how did the labor market 
respond to this influx of low-wage workers?  I summarize the research on each of these 
questions next. 
Did Policy Influence Work Behavior?  Figure 4 indicates that work among single 
mothers started to rise in the mid-1990s, strongly suggesting that policy was important to 
this change.  Other more controlled evidence supports this conclusion. 
Moffitt (1999a) and Schoeni and Blank (2000) investigate the effects of waivers 
on labor force participation and weeks and hours of work.   Both conclude that waivers 
had a significant and positive impact on work behavior among less-skilled women.  In 
contrast, Schoeni and Blank (2000) find few effects of TANF implementation on 
increasing labor market participation; once they control for state unemployment and 
income changes, the post-1996 rise in labor force participation among less-skilled women 
is fully explained.  Using a slightly different data set and empirical techniques O’Neill 
and Hill (2001) find that both economy and policy matter in the post-TANF era.
56     
                                                           
55 Devere (2001) cites these numbers in summarizing a large number of state leaver studies.  Loprest’s 
(2001) national survey of leavers finds average wages of $7.15 among those who left welfare between 1997 
and 1999.  Moffitt and Roff (2000) cite average wages of $7.50.  Cancian, et. al. (1999) cite $6.50-$7.50 as 
the typical wage range of leavers. 
56 The lack of time fixed effects in the O’Neill and Hill study almost surely results in a larger coefficient on 
the TANF dummy variable than in other studies.   53
In short, these regression studies conclude that policy changes appear to have 
mattered in the mid-1990s, although the strong labor market unambiguously helped 
increase work among less skilled women as well.  These studies focus only on welfare 
reform, however, and are largely unable to separately identify the effects of larger 
national changes in the EITC or the minimum wage. 
There is unanimous agreement that the growing EITC increased labor force 
participation among single parents.  A number of studies, including Eissa and Liebman 
(1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Blank, Card, and Robins (2000), Ellwood (2000), 
and Hotz, Mullin and Scholz (2001), all find that a sizable component of the growth in 
labor force participation among single women can be linked to the EITC expansions.
57   
The lack of studies that effectively include both welfare reforms and EITC changes 
makes it difficult to talk about the comparative impact of these two policy changes.   
Grogger (forthcoming) is unique in trying to explicitly control for both EITC parameters 
and welfare reform effects.  He finds significant effects of the EITC on welfare usage and 
work behavior as well as significant policy reform effects.  Ellwood (2000) argues the 
independent effects of the policies cannot be accurately separated because many of the 
welfare reforms were administrative in nature and interacted with the strong economy 
and the growth of EITC supports. 
The minimum wage also rose in both the early and the mid 1990s.  While 
minimum wage increases should raise the returns to work among low skilled workers, 
they might also result in a loss of jobs.  Despite a great deal of debate about minimum 
wage effects on teenagers, we have far less evidence of minimum wage effects on single 
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mothers.  Card and Krueger (1995) summarize the studies on minimum wage effects; 
almost all focus on teenage employment. Bernstein and Schmitt (1998) investigate the 
minimum wage increases of 1996 and 1997 and conclude there is little evidence of job 
loss among adults due to these minimum wage changes.  Neumark (2001) finds the 
changes affected employment primarily among unskilled teen workers. 
Only one paper has addressed the effect of child care subsidy policies under 
welfare reform on mothers’ work behavior.  Lemke, Witt, and Witte (2001) use data from 
Massachusetts to demonstrate that the availability of subsidies and the attributes of the 
local child care market both affect the probability a welfare recipient moves into work.  
Ideally, one would like to measure the combined effects of all policy changes, as 
well as their individual (and potentially interactive) effects.  Research that does this is not 
available.  It does appear, however, that both the welfare reforms and the growing work 
support programs of the 1990s contributed to the sharp rise in work among single parents.   
  A final set of evidence on the impact of welfare reform on labor market 
participation comes from the randomized experiments that measure the impact of specific 
welfare-to-work efforts on the behavior of the experimental group (the group that 
receives the program) versus the control group (the group that does not receive the 
program).  This evidence is voluminous, with two decades of experiments that analyze 
various welfare-to-work efforts.  Almost unanimously, these studies indicate a significant 
positive effect of welfare-to-work efforts on labor market participation, although the size 
of that impact varies across studies and programs (Gueron and Pauly, 1991; Bloom and 
Michalopoulos, 2001).  I summarize some more recent contributions to this experimental 
literature in more detail in Section VIII below.   55
  How Did the Labor Market Respond?  The large influx of less-skilled women into 
the labor market constitutes a substantial increase in labor supply.  A best estimate is that 
welfare reform will increase labor supply among less-skilled women by a little over 1 
million workers between 1996 and 2002 (Bartik, 2000, Table 2.1).  This is a labor supply 
shock equal to 3.1 percent of employment among all women with less than a college 
degree.  
An outward shift in the labor supply curve of one group of less-skilled workers 
would be expected to lower wages for all less-skilled workers, if the new group is a close 
substitute for existing workers.  An observer might be particularly worried about how 
these labor force participation increases have affected other previously-working less-
skilled women.  Although the less-skilled male labor force tends to work in a somewhat 
different set of occupations and industries (Blank and Schmidt, 2001), there is enough 
overlap in jobs that this group should also be affected.
58   
  The raw data suggests that any supply shifts (which would have lowered wages) 
were swamped by the overall demand increase due to a booming economy.  Wages 
among less skilled women rose throughout the 1990s and unemployment rates fell.  In 
fact, female unemployment rates were at their lowest point in several decades, while 
wages among less skilled women were at their highest point in several decades by the end 
of the 1990s.  As a result, there was little public discussion of displacement issues.  Of 
course, it is always possible that wages would have risen even faster in the absence of 
this supply shift. 
                                                           
58 Black, McKinnish, and Sanders (forthcoming) show that shocks to wages of low-skilled men affect 
levels of welfare receipt.   56
  There is evidence that the rapid labor supply increase among single moms might 
have affected other groups.  As Figure 4 indicates, labor force participation increases 
among married women with children slowed noticeably in the latter part of the 1990s, at 
just the time when work among single women with children expanded.  Even more 
striking, among less-skilled men labor force participation over the 1990s continued to fall 
(Holzer and Offner, 2001).  This surprised labor economists, who would have predicted 
that the strong economy of the 1990s would pull more of these men into the labor force.
59  
On the other hand, it is hard to believe that men (or women) were deterred from entering 
the labor market by increased employment among ex-welfare recipients when overall 
unemployment rates were hovering around 4 percent throughout the country and 
employers complained constantly about a lack of workers. 
  Several papers have tried to document who hired ex-welfare recipients.  Holzer 
and Stoll (2001) analyze survey data from employers in four major cities in 1998 and 
1999 and find that three percent of all job openings went to ex-welfare recipients.  Lane 
and Stevens (2001) use administrative data from Maryland to investigate whether certain 
employer characteristics are more likely to result in long-term employment by newly-
hired welfare recipients.  They find that welfare leavers appear to have significantly  
different experiences in different industries, among smaller versus larger employers, and 
among shrinking versus growing emplowers. 
  Bartik (2000, 2001) takes on the displacement issue.  He indicates that welfare 
reform is unlikely to have large effects on the overall labor market, since the labor supply 
shock is too small.  He estimates the effect on wages and employment among less-skilled 
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force participation among young men in metropolitan areas in the mid-1990s, although they could find no   57
labor market groups using a variety of models and indicates that different estimation 
approaches can result in quite different numbers.   For instance, estimates of the elasticity 
of labor demand to changes in labor supply vary widely across models.  Bartik’s 
preferred estimates suggest that welfare reform should reduce wages among female high 
school dropouts by between 5 and 15 percent.
60  Wage effects among other groups are 
lower.  He forecasts that the effects of welfare reform on wages and employment among 
less skilled women will be larger and more visible in the near future. 
  It is difficult to untangle the effect of changing labor supply when labor demand is 
also changing rapidly.  Bartik’s estimates suggest that the answer depends very much 
upon the model specified.  This is a ripe area for further investigation, including a closer 
look at why labor supply among less-skilled men did not grow over the 1990s, better 
estimates of the labor demand elasticities for less-skilled workers, and attention to the 
effects of any future economic slow-down on (more recently hired) ex-welfare recipients 
versus other labor market participants.   
 
VII.    Income, Poverty and Well-Being 
  Many would claim that the overall effects of welfare reform should be evaluated 
in terms of their net income-increasing or poverty-reducing impacts.
61 As we will see, 
this is a much less-well understood area of analysis than the analysis of caseload change 
or labor force participation. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
effects for adult men.  
60 Others who have simulated these effects with simpler models include Bernstein (1997) and Solow 
(1998). 
61 The 1996 legislation itself made no mention of poverty reduction.   58
In part, this reflects the fundamental problem of appropriately measuring 
economic well-being.  Cash income is not an adequate concept if many low-income 
families receive in-kind benefits.  There are serious problems with underreported income 
among the low-income population (Edin and Lein, 1997).   After-tax income may be a 
better measure than before-tax income, particularly in a period when tax rules (especially 
the EITC) for low-income families are changing.
62   One might want to measure 
disposable income and include an accounting for unavoidable transportation or child care 
expenses associated with entering the work force.   Even better, one might want to look at 
consumption rather than income data.  Unfortunately, data are not readily available that 
provide reliable and consistent information on all of these measures.   Even if one focuses 
only on changes in income-based poverty or poverty gaps (the two poverty-based 
measures that are most often used) there are difficulties in measurement and 
interpretation, as discussed in Section III above. 
Finally, it is worth noting that many other measures of well-being than income, 
poverty, or even consumption might seem useful.  One might want to know about quality 
of housing, food intake and nutrition, crime victimization, mental health, health insurance 
access, or access to good public education.  Welfare reforms may change child well-
being by affecting parental oversight as well as family income.
63  Consistent data on 
these measures are even less available than are credible income measures.   
In this section I summarize what is known about the interaction between welfare 
reform and changes in income, poverty, and other measures of well-being.  The existing 
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information described in this section is quite limited. There is a great need for more 
research, better data and more comprehensive measurement of well-being changes and 
their relationship to the 1996 legislative reforms. 
A major premise of the 1996 reform was the claim that work would make people 
better off.  Those who testified in favor of this legislation presented charts at 
Congressional hearings showing that women who worked would be economically better 
off than women who stayed on welfare, particularly with the minimum wage and EITC 
changes enacted by earlier Congresses (Haskins, 2001).  Indeed, a series of simulation 
exercises done in the late 1990s showed unambiguously that steady work, even at a 
relatively low wage, when combined with the EITC, with child care assistance, with 
access to Medicaid, with Food Stamp and Child Support assistance, would leave a 
woman substantially better off (Acs, et. al., 1998).  Critics claimed that these simulations 
were unreliable since many women did not have access to all of these work supports and 
many women were not able to find or maintain steady employment.  The evidence on 
income and poverty (Tables 3 through 5) suggest that most single mothers had higher 
incomes by the end of the 1990s, despite a loss in government assistance.   
Leavers’ Studies.  Few of the studies of ex-welfare recipients contain any 
information on overall economic well-being of leavers; most focus only on welfare use 
and labor force participation.    Haskins (2001) indicates that income among welfare 
leavers in these studies must be around $11,000, based on earnings and work information.  
Among those studies that calculate poverty rates, most find quite high poverty among 
leavers, although the numbers vary widely.  For instance, Loprest (2001) uses a national 
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survey data measuring material well-being among children.   60
survey of leavers to suggest that 48 percent remain poor.  Danziger, et. al. (2001) report 
about 50 percent of welfare leavers were poor (based on annual incomes two years after 
welfare receipt.)  Moffitt and Roff (2000) look at data in three cities and estimate that 74 
percent of leavers are poor.  Cancian, et. al. (1999) uses data from the NLSY to indicate 
that 55 percent of women are poor in the year following an exit from welfare, but this 
falls to 42 percent five years later.  Bavier (2002) looks at monthly panel data on welfare 
leavers from the SIPP and concludes that income rises over time among leavers, in part 
because earnings of other family members rise. 
Two studies provide some comparisons over time.  Loprest (2001) finds evidence 
of slight improvements in the percent working and the monthly earnings of women who 
left welfare between 1997-99 versus leavers from 1995-97.  This should mean that later 
leavers had higher incomes, and indeed poverty rates are lower in this group.  Cancian, 
et. al. (2002), in a study based on Wisconsin data alone, find evidence of lower earnings 
among welfare leavers in 1997 versus 1995.  Neither of these studies, however, can 
control for changes in the composition or selectivity of welfare leavers over time.
64 
Regression Analysis of Poverty and Income Changes.  None of the evidence cited 
above attempts to separately identify the causal factors behind income and poverty 
changes over the 1990s.  Three studies listed in Table 6 have looked at these variables, 
using the now-familiar state panel data methodology to estimate the determinants of 
changes in family income and poverty probabilities.    
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looked only at earnings and have no information on overall income changes.  A few more recent studies of 
waivers involving multiple program changes are exceptions to this.  Consistent with leaver study results, 
these tend to show little change in income (Bloom and Michalopoulos, 2001).   61
Schoeni and Blank (2000) find that the waivers enacted in the early 1990s 
appeared to increase income among low-income women.  Moffitt (1999) finds an effect 
of waivers on earnings, but their estimated effect on total income is small and poorly 
determined.
65  Grogger (forthcoming) finds that waivers and TANF reforms increased 
both earnings and income.  Schoeni and Blank investigate the impact of waivers and 
TANF on poverty rates as well as income.  They find that the implementation of waivers 
is associated with a 2.4 point decline in the poverty rate among less-skilled women, 
holding the state economic climate constant.  The implementation of TANF is associated 
with a 2.0-2.2 point decline in the poverty rate among less-skilled women.  This evidence 
suggests that the welfare reform policies had income-improving effects for disadvantaged 
women.
66 Gunderson and Ziliak (2001) investigate the effects of welfare reform on 
poverty rates and poverty gaps among different subgroups among the poor and also find 
significant effects.  
These results, based on national samples of all low income women, are stronger 
than those from studies that look only at welfare leavers.  This suggests that income 
increases among those who don’t enter welfare (that is, the non-entrants who would have 
gone on welfare in the pre-reform period but choose to remain off welfare post-reform) 
are large.  This is precisely what one might expect if non-entrants were self-selected to be 
more employable.  It is also worth noting that leaver studies typically do not ask about 
income or earnings among other family members, which several studies find to be a 
major reason why total incomes among single mothers are rising. 
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that waivers appear to have benefited all women with less than a high school degree.  In contrast, TANF   62
Consistent with these results are estimates by Meyer and Sullivan (2001) who 
focus on consumption rather than income among single mothers.  They find that total 
consumption of single mothers increases in the mid-1990s, both absolutely and relative to 
income among women without children and married mothers.  (There are a few 
subgroups for which this is not true.)  They interpret this as evidence that welfare reform 
did not harm women’s well-being.
67 
  The well-being of two specific groups deserves mention.  Legal immigrants 
entering the country after August 1996 were made ineligible for virtually all forms of 
federal public assistance (TANF, Food Stamps, Medicaid, or SSI).
68  The impact of this 
provision is likely to grow over time as a growing share of new immigrants are covered 
by it.  There has been remarkably little literature studying the impact of these provisions 
on the behavior and well-being of the immigrant population.  Use of public assistance 
among immigrants has fallen much more rapidly than among non-immigrants.   For 
instance, between 1994 and 1998, the share of immigrants receiving AFDC/TANF or 
Food Stamps fell almost in half (Borjas, 2001a, Table 14-2).  Food Stamp receipt among 
eligible citizen children living with immigrant parents fell from 80 percent in 1994 to 46 
percent in 1999.
69  Both Lofstrom and Bean (2001) and Haider, et. al. (2001) claim that 
the faster declines in immigrant welfare use are largely due to different local labor 
markets in high-immigrant versus low-immigrant regions.  Kaestner and Kaushal (2001) 
suggest that welfare changes have increased employment among more recently-arrived 
                                                                                                                                                                             
appears to have benefited only female high school dropouts above the 20
th percentile of the income 
distribution of all female high school dropouts. 
67 Another closely-related topic is the effect of welfare reform on household savings.  Hurst and Ziliak 
(2001) provide an analysis of this issue. 
68 At their option, states were allowed to run state-funded programs serving immigrants and a number of 
states have taken this option (Borjas, 2001b).  California, with the largest immigrant population, is 
particularly generous.   63
immigrants.  Further studies looking at the connections between these policy changes and 
the changing economic and employment status of immigrants would be very useful. 
  A second group of concern is children.  Duncan and Chase-Lansdale (2001a, 
2001b) provide the best available discussion of how child well-being might interact with 
welfare reform.  Below, I discuss evidence on the impact of financial incentive welfare-
to-work programs on child well-being.  Evidence is limited that relates welfare reform 
more broadly with child outcomes.  Bennett, Lu and Song (2001) argue that welfare 
reform has led to an income decline among families where the parent has less than a high 
school degree.  Paxson and Waldfogel (forthcoming) indicate that higher rates of out-of-
home placement appear linked with some aspects of welfare reform.  Haider, Jacknowitz, 
and Schoeni (2001b) show that breastfeeding rates appear lower due to greater work 
behavior.  This is another area where further research would be highly useful. 
 
VIII.  Experimental Evaluations of Specific Policy Choices 
While experimental evaluations of welfare reform programs have limitations, as 
discussed above, they provide some of the most credible evidence about the effects of 
specific reforms.  I focus here on a few topics which have been evaluated by random 
assignment methodology and that particularly add to our theoretical and empirical 
knowledge of the effects of redesigned welfare programs.  This section reviews the 
evidence on three specific policy choices:  Mandatory employment programs, earnings 
disregards and financial incentive programs, and time limits. 
Mandatory Employment Programs.  Since the mid-1980s, states have 
experimented with a wide variety of welfare-to-work employment programs.  Most of 
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these have been mandatory, meaning that welfare recipients who are ruled to be “work 
eligible” are required to participate if they want to continue receiving welfare benefits.  
Summaries of evaluations of earlier welfare-to-work efforts, both mandatory and 
voluntary, can be found in Gueron and Pauly (1991) and Friedlander and Burtless (1995). 
States that received waivers from AFDC program rules to run strong mandatory 
welfare-to-work programs in the early 1990s were also required to fund a serious 
evaluation of their new program, typically a random assignment evaluation.  As a result 
of this, a wide variety of mandatory welfare-to-work programs were evaluated in the 
early 1990s.  The results from these programs are nicely summarized in Bloom and 
Michalopoulos (2001) and in Michalopoulos and Schwartz (2001), both of which review  
randomized evaluations of 20 mandatory welfare-to-work programs in specific states.
70   
Virtually all of these programs produced some significant increases in 
employment and reductions in welfare usage and payments.  Earnings per year increased 
between $200 and $600 in most programs.
71  Michalopoulos and Schwartz (2001) break 
these results down for different groups of participants.  They indicate little difference in 
the employment gains experienced by the most versus the least disadvantaged 
participants in these programs (which means that the ongoing earnings and employment 
differentials between these two groups remained about the same after recipients 
participated in mandatory welfare-to-work programs, although both groups worked more 
and earned more).  It is particularly interesting that employment outcomes did not seem 
significantly worse among less skilled participants, or participants with identifiable 
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follow-up of 11 welfare-to-work programs. 
71 The largest earnings increase occurred in the Riverside County GAIN program, where annual earnings 
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barriers to work, such as child care problems.  The one group that appears not to benefit 
from these programs are recipients at a high risk of depression. 
A key comparison in these studies is between those programs that focused on job 
search or labor force attachment (LFA) through some sort of work-first program that 
pushed recipients into jobs as rapidly as possible, and those programs that focused on 
human capital development (HCD) and provided more training and educational 
opportunities to recipients.  Three programs included side-by-side evaluations of LFA 
versus HCD welfare-to-work programs within the same location (Atlanta, GA, Grand 
Rapids, MI, and Riverside County, CA).  Other programs had somewhat mixed models, 
including work-first efforts for some recipients and education and training for others. 
While labor economists are particularly likely to predict that education and 
training will make people better off in the long run, the existing evaluations challenge 
that assessment.  Work-first and LFA programs increased earnings and decreased welfare 
usage more quickly, while HCD programs cost more, particularly in the first year when 
women were in training rather than working.  But even three years out, after women from 
HCD programs had been in the labor market for up to two years, HCD participants did 
not outperform LFA participants.  This may suggest that the gains to experience among 
women who have been out of the labor market may be larger than the gains to education 
and training, at least initially.  While the HCD programs significantly increased the 
number of participants holding a GED degree, there was little evidence that this resulted 
in higher earnings or more work hours (Freedman, et. al., 2000).   
These evaluations had three year follow-up surveys, at the most.  Using data from 
the California GAIN program, Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2000) match control and   66
treatment group members from earlier welfare-to-work programs in California with 
earnings records, allowing them to follow welfare-to-work participants (and their control 
groups) for up to nine years afterwards.  They find that in years 7-9, those who received 
more education or training are doing as well or better than those who were put into work-
first programs.  Their conclusion is that the HCD programs look better with longer-term 
evaluations.  This study uses data from one state only, and verifying these results for 
other programs would be useful.   
Interestingly, the best results from these studies occur in programs with mixed 
activities, suggesting that a combination of work-first for some women and education for 
others might be optimal.  For instance, the Portland, OR, program and the GAIN program 
in Butte, CA, for single women showed $1200/year earnings increases, while GAIN 
Riverside (CA) showed $1400/year increases (Bloom and Michalopoulos, 2001).  Further 
experimentation with mixed activity programs would be useful, particularly evaluations 
of retention-based programs that provide education, training, or job retention services to 
women after they have worked for a period.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that many 
women who participate in work-first programs appear to recognize the need for further 
training at a later date.  Some women lose their jobs and have difficulty finding another 
job.  Second-chance programs would aim at assisting job retention or providing training 
after a woman has acquired some labor market experience.  No programs of this sort for 
women moving from welfare to work have been evaluated with randomized experimental 
evaluations. 
A disappointing aspect of the mandatory work programs is that they provide little 
evidence of increased income.  In fact, increases in earnings appear to be entirely offset   67
by losses in public assistance income.
72  Hence, these programs have no anti-poverty 
effects.  This has led to a great deal of interest in the use of earnings disregards in 
conjunction with mandatory work, to create work incentives and subsidize earnings at the 
same time.  
  Earnings Disregards and Financial Incentive Programs.  Several studies have 
tested the effects of strong earnings supplements as a way to incentivize work and reduce 
welfare usage.   These so-called “financial incentive programs” include the Minnesota 
Family Investment Program (MFIP) (Miller, et. al., 2000, and Gennetian and Miller, 
2000), the New York Child Assistance (CAP) program (DeMarco and Mills, 2000), the 
New Hope program in Milwaukee (Bos, et. al., 1999), the Work Restructuring Project 
(WRP) in Vermont (Bloom, et. al., 1998), and the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) in 
Canada (Michalopoulos, et. al., 2000).  Two of these programs – MFIP and SSP -- have 
explicitly tested the combined versus separate effects of earnings disregards and other 
employment service programs.   Three other programs have been evaluated that included 
financial incentives along with other policies: the Connecticut Jobs First program 
(Bloom, et. al., 2000b), the Florida Family Transition Program (FTP) (Bloom, et. al., 
2000a), and the Iowa Family Investment Program (FIP) (Fraker and Jacobson, 2000).  In 
these three evaluations it is difficult to make statements about the effect of financial 
incentives only, but they do show the combined effects of financial incentives along with 
a mix of other mandatory and voluntarily-available job search services.  Table 7 shows 
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the effects of these programs on a set of key variables, as measured by random 
assignment evaluations.
73 
  Because of their strong evaluation results, both MFIP and SSP have garnered a 
great deal of interest and I describe them briefly to the reader.  MFIP was implemented in 
Minnesota in 1994, and provided a strong earnings disregard that allowed women to 
receive some cash assistance until their earnings were about 140 percent of the poverty 
line.
74  Participants were also required to participate in mandatory job search programs.  
A subset of the treatment group was provided with the financial incentives from earnings 
disregards, but not subject to mandatory job search requirements.  A control group 
continued to receive AFDC.  Participants were randomized into both treatment groups 
and the control group, so that the separate effects of mandatory job search and earnings 
disregards could be explored. 
  The SSP program was implemented in 1992 in two provinces in Canada (New 
Brunswick and British Columbia).
75  It offered a randomly chosen group of women on 
welfare (known as Income Assistance in Canada) an alternative:  If they agreed to leave 
welfare, they could receive an earnings supplement in every month when they  averaged 
30 hours of work per week or more.  The supplement was large and roughly doubled the 
earnings of most participants.  It was calculated as half the difference between a 
participant’s earnings and an “earnings benchmark”, set at $30,000 in New Brunswick 
and $37,000 in British Columbia (Canadian dollars).  The supplement was reduced by 50 
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Robbins (2000) or Michalopoulos and Berlin (2001). 
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cents for every dollar of earnings.   Some of these women were also randomly assigned to 
an SSP-Plus program, which combined the earnings supplement with job-related services 
such as resume writing assistance, job search assistance, and self-esteem workshops.  
Participation in these services was not mandatory, so the evaluation compares the effect 
of earnings supplements with and without voluntary employment services. 
  The results of the earnings disregard experiments suggest that positive work 
incentives coming through larger earnings disregards can increase employment.  The top 
part of Table 7 indicates that employment increased by 3.6 percent among those receiving 
MFIP financial incentives only, and by 3.3 percent in the New York CAP program.  The 
relatively small financial incentives in the Vermont WRP program led to almost no 
employment effects.    
As discussed above, mandatory employment programs alone appear to have little 
effect on income or poverty, but Table 7 indicates that the MFIP incentive-based program 
had significant positive effects on monthly income and significant negative effects on 
poverty (although WRP and CAP did not.)  In the MFIP incentives program, this was 
entirely due to the earnings benefit supplements; earnings actually decreased slightly.   
This highlights the fact that earnings disregard programs cost more, since they pay 
benefits to supplement earnings of workers, phasing out more slowly than less-generous 
welfare programs.  Hence, these programs tended not to reduce the cost or the usage of 
welfare assistance.  They significantly increased the amount of assistance that went to 
workers, however, rather than non-workers.   
Most promising of all were the programs that combined employment programs 
with earnings disregards, shown in the bottom half of Table 7.  The SSP earnings   70
supplement required working 30 hours per week and provided the largest financial 
incentive to work among these programs.  The result was a 7.2 percent employment gain 
among those offered the SPP program, significant income increases, and a greater than 9 
percent decline in poverty rates.
76  The full MFIP program that included both generous 
disregards and mandatory employment programs had large positive effects on 
employment and income, and significant negative effects on poverty.  This was due to 
both significant earnings increases combined with significant ongoing cash transfers to 
the workers.
77  The MFIP evaluation allows us to measure the separate impact of 
disregards versus mandatory employment; the results indicate that the significant 
employment effects depended upon the mandatory employment program, while the anti-
poverty effects depended upon the high earnings disregard.  
Other programs that combined both financial incentives and strong work 
requirements show similar gains in both employment and in income.  As Table 7 
indicates, the Connecticut Jobs First program and the Vermont Welfare Restructuring 
Program resulted in strong earnings and employment gains, and (smaller) income gains.  
The Florida FTP program and the Iowa FIP programs have limited earnings disregards, 
but these are large enough that the loss of cash transfers is less than the earnings gains, 
hence women in these programs also increased employment and increased earnings.  
Again, these results are a sharp contrast to the mandatory employment programs alone, 
where earnings gains are typically entirely offset by cash transfer losses. 
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 The evidence in Table 7 is striking and worth emphasis.  In traditional welfare 
programs (see Figure 2), maximum benefits are paid to non-workers.  Hence, traditional 
welfare programs typically increase income but reduce labor supply at the same time, 
creating inefficiencies.  Burtless (1986) notes that in the Negative Income Tax 
experiments, the government had to spend almost $2 to increase incomes by $1, largely 
because of labor supply reductions.  In contrast, financial incentives programs (especially 
those with mandatory employment programs) provided strong work incentives at the 
same time they supplemented incomes.  In these programs, both labor supply and income 
increased.    
Part I of Table 8 presents calculations of income gains per dollar spent for some 
of the financial incentive programs that included both incentives and work requirements.  
Column 1 shows income gains to program participants and column 2 shows transfer 
payments.  Column 3 indicates the income gains per dollar transferred.  An alternative 
calculation occurs in column 6 which shows total program benefits (column 4, including 
such things as the imputed value of additional health care) per dollar of total program 
costs (column 5, transfers plus the provision of other services and administration).  In 
looking at Table 8, one might be tempted to think that programs with a benefit/cost ratio 
of less than one should not be run.  I caution against this interpretation.  In many cases 
programs with lower benefit/cost ratios may offer important and necessary services.  
Programs with higher benefit/cost ratios are relatively more appealing, but the data in 
Table 8 do not allow one to drawing any absolute conclusions about the value of these 
programs.   72
In the SSP program, $1 in government transfers increased income by almost $2 
among long-term welfare recipients since the earnings supplements were reinforced by 
increased labor supply.   In MFIP (among long-term recipients) the gain is even larger 
and $1 in government transfers increased income by almost $2.50; New Hope also shows 
substantial gains.  Only two-parent families in MFIP show relatively small gains for each 
dollar transferred.  This suggests that these financial incentive programs are relatively 
efficient in redistributing income.   Even in column 6, where the calculation is based on 
total program costs, the ratios are better than the 0.50 number cited by Burtless for the 
negative income tax (again the exception is among two-parent families in MFIP.)
78 
In contrast, the mandatory employment programs summarized in part II of Table 
8 show much smaller benefit gains in absolute terms (column 4) and generally lower 
income gains per dollar of government spending (column 6).   In some cases, there are 
actual income losses among recipients, resulting in negative ratios.  As redistributive 
programs, these are simply less effective.  These mandatory employment programs were 
generally not focused on income gains, so it may be unfair to judge them on this basis.  In 
fact, a primary goal of most of these programs was to reduce government spending, and 
many of them were quite effective at that.  Some of these programs, such as Riverside 
GAIN, even saved the government substantial amounts of money per recipient; while 
income gains were small in Riverside, the government savings suggests a very efficient 
transfer program.   
In addition to their income-enhancing effects for the family and their 
employment-enhancing effects for the parent, financial incentive programs also appeared 
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to have positive effects on children’s outcomes.  A number of these studies have 
collected data on child outcomes as well as on employment and income.  Morris, et. al. 
(2001) summarize this research and indicate that earnings supplement programs (alone or 
combined with mandatory employment programs) appear to have significant and positive 
effects on school achievement and child behaviors among elementary-school-age 
children.
79  Mandatory employment programs alone do not appear to produce these gains.  
These effects are strongest among the children of long-term welfare recipients.  Duncan 
and Chase-Lansdale (2001a) suggest that these changes appear to be operating through 
changes in the utilization of child care or after-school programs, rather than through 
changes in home environments.  
Adolescent effects are based on smaller samples and are less positive.  Two 
studies find reductions in achievement and increases in behavioral problems among teens 
whose mothers participate in work incentive programs. 
The evidence that financial incentive programs can reduce poverty, increase 
earnings, and may even improve child outcomes at the same time, particularly when 
combined with other job-related services, suggest that these financial incentive programs 
are the most promising avenue of policy change to come out of the U.S. (and Canadian) 
welfare reforms of the mid-1990s.  Several caveats about these results should be noted, 
however.  First, these financial incentive programs have not been run in a random set of 
states.  The strongest results come from Minnesota and Canada, and might not be 
generalizable to other locations.  Second, the wide variance in results shown in Table 8 
suggests that financial incentive programs are more effective with some populations.  
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under age 3.   For an earlier summary of the literature see Hamilton, et. al. (2000).   74
  Time Limits.  The effects of time limits have been studied both by randomized 
experiments and through larger econometric studies of national data.  It is fair to say, 
however, that we lack a great deal of information about the effect of time limits, largely 
because not enough time has passed to evaluate them.  By mid-2000, only about 60,000 
families had hit time limits of one sort or another.  Only in late 2001 and early 2002 will 
the first group of women who were continuously on welfare since TANF was enacted 
begin to hit the 60-month time limit set in many states.  As more and more families hit 
the five-year time limits over the near future, there will be more opportunities to study the 
effects of these time limits. 
  Six state programs that implemented time limits earlier (through state waiver 
programs) have been studied through random assignment experiments (Arizona, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Indiana and Virginia).  In none of these states do time 
limits show large effects on employment, though there is some evidence that women are 
leaving welfare early in order to preserve welfare eligibility in the future.
80 
  These results are somewhat difficult to interpret, however.  These experiments 
were conducted on the very first group of women anywhere in the United States to hit 
time limits.  This group may be more prone to misunderstand the implications of time 
limits or to disbelieve that they would actually be enforced.  Furthermore, all of these 
experiments are studying of a larger set of changes, which include time limits as one 
component.  In none of these studies can the independent effects of time limits be 
deduced.  Conclusions about the effect of time limits on employment are largely based on 
comparisons between the results in these states to experimental results in other states   75
without time limits.  In addition, none of these evaluations can investigate the entry 
effects of time limits, that is, the extent to which they discourage families from receiving 
welfare in the first place. 
  The effects of time limits on families are an issue of great interest and scrutiny.    
Some evidence indicates that a high share of clients who are subject to future time limits 
do not entirely understand this provision.  The evidence from Florida suggests that the 
most disadvantaged were the least affected by Florida’s time-limited program; it had few 
effects on their employment, earnings or income (Bloom, et. al., 2000a).  Those who hit 
the time limit in Florida were clearly struggling financially, but were not notably worse 
off than many other families who left welfare for other reasons.  Time limits in Florida 
did appear to reduce welfare use the most among families with younger children 
(Grogger and Michalopoulos, 1999).  Those who are “sanctioned off” welfare may be 
similar to those who hit time limits.  Leavers’ studies indicate that those who leave 
welfare due to sanctions are less likely to be employed after leaving welfare and are also 
more disadvantaged than other leavers across a range of attributes (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 2000).  Lack of long follow-up periods in many of these studies 
makes it difficult to evaluate the long-term effects of time limits or sanctions. 
 
IX.  Marriage and Fertility Changes 
  A major impetus for welfare reform within the U.S. has been ongoing concern 
about rises in out-of-wedlock births and declining marriage rates, especially among low 
                                                                                                                                                                             
80 See Bloom (1999), Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001) and Pavetti and Bloom (2001) for summaries of 
CN, DE, FL and VA studies and references to the original experimental results.  The AZ and IN 
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income women and men.  Indeed, the major stated goals of the 1996 legislation included  
reducing out-of-wedlock births and increasing marriage.   
There are several mechanisms by which welfare reform might accomplish this.  A 
simple economic model would suggest that means-tested transfer programs make it easier 
for lower-income couples to afford a child.   Furthermore, the fact that most of this 
support has historically been focused on single mothers and not married couples means 
that the incentives to marry are limited.  While changes in cash assistance programs made 
assistance to two-parent couples more available in the early 1990s
81, growth in the EITC 
increased the marriage penalty for low-income workers (Ellwood, 2000). 
In addition to standard economic incentive-based models, there are also a host of 
more cultural/behavioral models that claim the growth in out-of-wedlock childbearing is 
due to decreased social disapproval of out-of-wedlock childbearing and a shift in 
behavioral norms away from marriage.  Increases in means-tested support would make it 
easier for such shifts in marital and fertility norms to occur.
82 
Both of these theoretical approaches imply that recent U.S. changes in public 
assistance should have reduced the incentives to become a single mother and increased 
the incentives to marry.   Time limits, sanctions, diversion activities, and work incentives 
all make it harder to receive public assistance as a single mother without also engaging in 
work-related activities.   
Some states have gone beyond these welfare reforms to enact programs that are 
explicitly directed at fertility and marriage decision-making.  For instance, some state 
                                                           
81 The Family Support Act of 1988 required all states to make two-parent married couple families eligible 
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waivers in the early 1990s allowed states to mandate that teen mothers must stay in 
school and live at home with their parents (or in another supervised setting) if they are to 
receive cash assistance, the so-called “minor parent provision.”  Other states were given 
authority to enact “family caps”, which refuse benefit increases to welfare recipients who 
have further children outside of marriage.   After states received greater discretion under 
TANF, more states implemented these programs.
83 
Trends in the data.  Is there evidence of changes in fertility or marital behavior in 
the mid-1990s, similar to the labor force participation changes discussed above?  Figure 5 
shows the trends in three key variables.
84  Marriage rates have fallen steadily for many 
decades, with no noticeable break in trend over the 1990s.  Similarly, divorce rates are  
also slowly falling, with no change in the 1990s.  Birth rates to unmarried women did 
change noticeably around 1990, ending a steep increase to flatten out and even fall 
slightly over the 1990s.   This change in the nonmarital birth rate is evident among both 
black and white women, and among teens and older women, but occurs well before major 
welfare reforms were implemented.   
Further evidence on trends in key family structural variables can be seen by 
looking at the share of families with children that are headed by never-married females.
85  
This number has increased steadily from 3 percent in 1976 to over 10 percent in 2000, the 
highest level ever recorded.  When one looks at the trends in headship among never-
married mothers who have lower incomes or are less educated, however, there is a bit 
more evidence that the increases of the past two decades slowed somewhat in the mid-to-
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led to long-term increases in out-of-wedlock childbearing.  For a discussion of these behavioral arguments, 
see Murray (2001). 
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late 1990s.   Other recent evidence suggests that the share of children living with single 
mothers (particularly in African American families) declined significantly in the late 
1990s (Dupree and Primus, 2001).  This is at least consistent with the theory that welfare 
reform might be producing some behavioral changes among less skilled women. 
It might be unreasonable to expect any marriage or fertility effects from welfare 
reform to show up within a few years.   Only a relatively small share of the population 
gets pregnant or becomes married in any given year; changes in these decisions will 
affect aggregate numbers only slowly over time.  Furthermore, marriage and fertility 
patterns may be much more sluggish and resistant to change than is work behavior.  All 
of this suggests that identifying effects on family structure due to welfare reform is likely 
to be difficult, and any measured effects are likely to be small. 
Causal analysis of these changes.   The literature that relates the policy changes 
of the 1990s to changes in marital or fertility behavior is still quite limited and much 
good research remains to be done.  A large body of earlier work has analyzed the 
relationship between AFDC benefits and fertility behavior.  I do not review this literature 
here, in part because it has been well reviewed elsewhere (Moffitt, 1992; Moffitt, 1998b).  
The primary conclusion is that studies tend to show either no effects or small effects.  To 
cite Moffitt (1998a, p5) in the introduction to a book analyzing the relationship between 
welfare and fertility behavior, “[I]t is also fair to note that if there were a sizable effect of 
welfare on demographic behavior, it would probably be more evident with the available 
statistical methods than appears to be the case in the research literature.  The findings 
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reported in the chapters are…consistent with the existence of a small, real effect but one 
that is difficult to detect and sensitive to the methodology used[.]” 
Evidence of small effects in the existing literature do not imply that recent welfare 
reform effects must also be small, for at least two reasons.  First, this previous literature 
focuses on the effect of differences in welfare benefit levels on fertility patterns.  As 
discussed above, welfare benefit levels have not changed radically; rather, a host of other 
behavioral incentives and mandates have been imposed on welfare recipients.  These 
might have different and stronger effects, particularly if these changes seriously limit 
welfare benefit availability.  Second, programs like family caps and minor parent 
provisions are directly aimed at changing fertility behavior and might have larger and 
more direct effects than changes in benefits or availability.
86 
  Table 9 summarizes the literature that attempts to link welfare reform with 
changes in family structure.  Part A lists the econometric studies.  Horvath-Rose and 
Peters (2001) use state panel data to investigate out-of-wedlock birth trends from 1984 to 
1996, including controls for the implementation of family caps or minor parent 
provisions.  They find a significant and negative effect of family caps, similar to the New 
Jersey study.  The minor parent provision appears to have positive effects on nonmarital 
fertility in their study, however, which is not the expected sign and suggests that there 
may be omitted variable problems with the entire study.  Clearly, the mixed evidence on 
family caps suggests that further investigation might be useful.   Schoeni and Blank 
(2000) use panel data to investigate the effects of waivers and of TANF implementation 
on the percent married and the probability of being a female household head.  They find   80
evidence that the policy reforms had small but significant effects on these family 
formation variables.  Fitzgerald and Ribar (2001) use data from the early 1990s and find 
state waivers had mixed results on female headship. 
  Part B of Table 9 summarizes econometric studies that have tried to investigate 
the expected effect of family caps using data from the AFDC program.  Fairlee and 
London (1997) look at whether differences in AFDC benefit levels change the likelihood 
that single mothers would have additional births.  They find little evidence of this.  Acs 
(1996) and Grogger and Bronars (2001) have similar results.  Argys, Averett and Rees 
(2000) investigate how AFDC benefits might affect pregnancy and abortion behavior.  
They find small effects that are highly sensitive to specification and methodology.   
Experimental evaluations of the effects of employment programs on marriage and 
fertility behavior (summarized in Part C of Table 9) show quite mixed results, from what 
are admittedly quite a different group of programs.
87  Three studies directly analyze 
actual family cap programs, each using quite different methodologies.  Camasso, et. al. 
(1998a, 1998b) report on a pre-post data comparison and an experimental comparison in 
New Jersey after family caps were implemented and indicate that the birth rate was  
significantly lower among those subject to family caps.  Some have raised concerns about 
the interpretability of these evaluations, however (Maynard, et. al., 1998).  The A Better 
Chance (ABC) program in Delaware ran a strong mandatory work activities program and 
included a family cap.  A randomized study of the program showed few effects on 
marriage or fertility (Fein, 1999).   
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The New Chance experiment, which provided educational and job assistance to 
teen welfare mothers (along with family planning counseling) found pregnancy rates in 
the experimental group actually increased in a randomized evaluation (Quint, Bos, and 
Polit, 1997).  The Teen Parent Demonstration (TPD) Project in Ohio, which required teen 
welfare mothers to participate in a rich set of education and work support programs, had 
no effect on second pregnancies (Kisker, Rangarajan and Boller, 1998).  The California 
Work Pays Demonstration (Hu, 2000) was a work-oriented welfare reform that increased 
marriage rates in some populations. 
The largest and most positive effect of welfare reform on family structure is found 
in the MFIP demonstration, discussed above as a particularly effective financial incentive 
program (Miller, et. al., 2000).   Single mothers who were in the MFIP experimental 
group married at a significantly higher rate than those in the control group, while two-
parent families in MFIP stayed married at a higher rate.
88    
Overall, the recent literature on the effects of policy on family structure has not 
provided clear guidance as to what states should do if they want to influence fertility and 
marriage through their welfare reform efforts.  While the MFIP results are cited as 
evidence that welfare reform can influence marriage, it would be useful to have 
additional experimental evidence that showed similarly strong and positive results on 
marriage or fertility from other state reform efforts.  Even some programs that explicitly 
focused on fertility issues as one component of welfare reform (such as New Chance or 
the TDP program) did not show the desired effects.  In addition, further econometric 
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exploration of the determinants of marriage and fertility trends, particularly focusing on 
the changes in the 1990s, would be highly interesting. 
 
X. Conclusion 
The U.S. welfare reforms of the 1990s have generated extensive interest.  Both 
the federal changes in work support programs like the EITC and the revolution in the 
design of state public assistance programs have drawn research attention.   While it is far 
too early to draw any final conclusions about the long-term effects of these program 
changes, the research literature to date has produced several important results.   
More significant caseload declines and larger increases in labor force participation 
among less-skilled mothers were possible than many observers would have predicted.  
Entry into welfare fell and exits from welfare rose.  There remains debate as to how much 
these results were due to a strong economy, to program reform, or to their interactive 
effects.  While some of this change in behavior is due to traditional labor supply 
responses to growing wages and increased financial incentives to work, the changes were 
greater than historical experience would lead one to expect.  State welfare programs were 
substantially different post-1996, including such elements as time limits, sanctions, and 
diversion efforts.  Tracking down the exact relationship between these program 
differences and specific behavioral changes remains difficult, but there is a growing body 
of evidence indicating that these new program elements mattered.    
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results on marriage.  Positive marriage effects occurred in one of the two sites, while the other site showed 
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At least over the late 1990s, these changes in behavior occurred along with 
moderate increases in cash income and moderate declines in poverty among less-skilled 
single mother families, those most affected by the policy changes.   This is in contrast to 
the mandatory employment programs of an earlier era, which increased labor supply but 
seemed to have few positive effects on income (earnings gains offset benefits losses).  
These positive outcomes were best demonstrated in a set of experimental evaluations of 
so-called “financial incentive programs” which both provided financial incentives to 
work while also mandating strong work efforts.  These programs, enacted in only a 
limited number of states, seem to have been particularly effective in increasing 
employment and reducing poverty, and they provide perhaps the best model of “new-
style” welfare programs.  Their results are markedly different from those of the older 
negative income tax experiments. 
The literature evaluating these welfare reforms is likely to continue to grow.  Let 
me mention three key areas where future research may be particularly important.  First, 
some important questions can only be answered after more time has passed.  We have 
only very preliminary evidence on whether these reforms have had any long-term impacts 
on marriage or fertility behavior.  Similarly, we are just at the beginning of observing the 
impact of actually imposing time limits on larger numbers of welfare recipients.  Most 
important, perhaps, is the question of how much the remarkable U.S. economy in the late 
1990s was fueling the declines in caseloads, and increases in work and income among 
low-wage single mothers.  Only as we experience economic cycles will we be able to 
effectively separate the economic effects from the policy effects of welfare reform.  
Tracking the changes in a less-robust economy will be important, as will investigating   84
whether certain states have packages of programs that make their low-income citizens 
more or less vulnerable in an economic downturn.   
Second, the well-being effects of these policy changes should be better 
understood.  We need to know more about families’ disposable income changes after 
leaving public assistance; about their long-term opportunities for wage and income 
growth as their labor market experience grows; and how families whose access to public 
assistance has become much more limited cope with the combined demands of work, 
parenting, and economic survival.  For instance, there is a growing interest in how such 
things as chronic child health problems (such as asthma) or parental mental health 
(particularly problems of depression) might interact negatively with efforts to become 
economically self-sufficient.   
Third, there is a need to develop adequate research experience in methodologies 
that these new research questions require.  This means a better understanding of how to 
effectively utilize administrative data sources; a better way to identify and code specific 
policy components within welfare reform; a better way to interpret and generalize 
program impacts from an increasingly diverse set of state programs; and more credible 
ways to identify policy effects and analyze their impacts on long-term behavioral 
changes. 
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$27,413 $31,152 $6,920 $9,720
$2,353
$3,888








Source for EITC Parameters: “The EITC and the Taxation of Lower-Income Working Families.”  Joint Economic Committee Staff Report, March
2000.  (http://www.seante.gov/~jec) 
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Single w/ kids under 18
Married w/ no kids
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Source: Tabulations of March Current Population Survey Data



























































































Birth Rate for All Unmarried 
Women Ages 15-44
Marriage Rate
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Reports. (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs) 
Figure 5 Table 1 




Selected Points In Benefit 
Distribution 1990 1995 2000
Percent Change
1995-2000
       
20th Percentile State  $358 (NC) $319    (IA)  $288   (IN) -19.60%
      
Median State  $480 (NE) $428    (IL) $379  (DC) -21.00%
      
80th Percentile State  $680 (MI) $607 (MD) $546 (WA) -19.70%
Source: State Policy Documentation Policy (www.spdp.org) and The Urban Institute 
(www.urban.org/).  
Note: Maximum benefit levels for family of three.  51 states (including D.C.) used in 
analysis.  
 
Cumulative Cash Welfare Available 
During First 24 Months of Work for a 
Welfare Recipient with 2 Children 
 
  Jan 1996 AFDC Program ($2000) 
Hourly Wage = $6/hour 
2000 TANF Program 
Hourly Wage = $6/hour 
 
State 








        
Alabama $0  $0  $492  $492 
Alaska $11887  $6175  $13478  $9794 
Arizona $0  $0  $0  $0 
Arkansas $0 $0  $0  $0 
California $4198  $788  $8724  $5700 
Colorado $131  $0  $3  $0 
Connecticut $7862  $2150  $13032  $13032 
Delaware $0 $0  $3096  $560 
District of Columbia  $126  $0  $1296  $0 
Florida $0  $0  $672  $0 
        
Georgia $144  $0  $16  $0 
Hawaii $3733  $710  $7882  $4785 
Idaho $0  $0  $0  $0 
Illinois $0  $0  $3108  $1112 
Indiana $0  $0  $0  $0 
Iowa $152  $0  $3024  $605 
Kansas $165  $0  $168  $0 
Kentucky $582  $0  $757  $524 
Louisiana $0 $0 $1140  $1140 
Maine $698  $26  $5568  $2544 
        
Maryland $0 $0  $0 $0 
Massachusetts $750  $78  $6000  $2976 
Michigan $294  $0  $456  $0 
Minnesota $608  $0 $7776  $4026 
Mississippi $0  $0  $1020  $1020 
Missouri $0  $0  $1614  $616 
Montana $647  $0  $1332  $0 
Nebraska $0 $0  $0  $0 
Nevada $0  $0  $1044  $1044 





















Table 2  
  Jan 1996 AFDC Program ($2000) 
Hourly Wage = $6/hour 
2000 TANF Program 
Hourly Wage = $6/hour 
 
State 








New Jersey  $225  $0  $1551  $424 
New Mexico  $0  $0  $3336  $312 
New York  $802  $130  $5294  $2028 
North Carolina  $660  $0  $816  $816 
North Dakota  $174  $0  $3399  $299 
Ohio $0  $0  $2952  $0 
Oklahoma $0  $0 $0 $0 
Oregon $298  $0  $0  $0 
Pennsylvania $131  $0  $672  $0 
Rhode Island  $703  $31  $6336  $3312 
        
South Carolina  $0  $0  $261  $82 
South Dakota  $501  $0  $0  $0 
Tennessee $827  $155  $1848  $0 
Texas $0  $0  $536  $435 
Utah $763  $91  $3024  $0 
Vermont $2133  $444  $4128  $0 
Virginia $0  $0  $6984  $5924 
Washington $668 $0  $4104  $1080 
West Virginia  $0  $0  $0  $0 
Wisconsin $544  $0 $0  $0 
Wyoming $892  $185  $0 $0 
        
Median State  $152  $0  $1140  $299 
        
Source: Author's calculations from program parameters found in the State Policy 
Documentation Project (www.spdp.org) and U.S. House of Representatives (1996).   
Note: All numbers in 2000 dollars.  Ignores any waivers that affected BRRs in 1995, and 
assumes all states are subject to the federally-mandated BRR. 
Table 2-continued Table 3 
U.S. Poverty Rates 
 
 
Percent Poor  1979 1989  1992 2000 
All Families  9.2% 10.3%  11.9% 8.6% 
        
Families with Single Female Householder  30.4% 32.2%  35.4% 24.7% 
        
Black Families, Single Female 
Householder 49.4% 46.5%  50.2% 34.6% 
        
Hispanic Families, Single Female 
Householder 49.2% 47.5%  49.3% 34.2% 
Source: The Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/) 
Note: 1979, 1989 and 2000 represent the end of extended periods of economic growth.  
1992 is the end of the recession of the early 1990s. 
 
  
Impact of the Safety Net on Poverty Gaps per Person 
(All persons in families with children, 1999 dollars) 
 
  Year 
  1993 1995 1997 1999 
Poverty Gap 
Based on: 
    
  Pretransfer Income  $2,737  $2,562 $2,562  $2,370 
  Plus Social       
      Insurance
a 
$2,559 $2,394 $2,338 $2,185 
  Plus Means-  
      tested Benefits
b 
$1,488 $1,419 $1,529 $1,547 
  Plus Federal    
      Taxes     
      (including  
      EITC) 
$1,447 $1,386 $1,514 $1,524 
Percent Reduction in Poverty Gap due to: 
  Social  
      Insurance 
16.1 15.8 18.4 17.7 
  Means-Tested    
      Benefits 
43.8 44.7 37.2 34.0 
  Federal Taxes   1.1  4.4  5.7   6.8 
 
            a.   Includes Social Security, disability, and worker’s compensation. 
b.  Includes cash benefits, food stamps, housing subsidies and school lunch. 
 
Source:  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2001). 
Table 4  
Average Income of Female-Headed Families by Quintile 
(1999 Dollars) 
 





Quintile 1  7,714  8,532 8,292 7,835 10.6 -5.5
Quintile 2  12,929  14,438 14,403 15,494 11.7 7.6
Quintile 3  16,216  18,971 18,850 19,984 17.0 6.0
Quintile 4  22,568  24,698 25,130 27,204 9.4 8.3
Quintile 5  42,718  47,057 50,801 59,858 10.2 17.8
Source:  Tabulations by Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
Table 5  
Research on Welfare Reform Impacts 
 
Part A:  Econometric Research on Welfare Reform Impacts Using Data Prior to 1996 Welfare Reform 
 
  Dependent    Key  Independent   
Study     Variable(s)          Variables      Results on Key Variables 
 
Bartik &  Log(AFDC caseloads   Multiple economic    • Local labor demand information is important in 
Eberts           per capita)     variables (including       explaining caseload changes and including these 
(1999)             unemploymt rates,        variables reduces the unemployment coefficient. 
  Based on state      and local labor market    • 1% increase in employment growth leads to 4% decline 
    administrative      demand information)      in caseloads, similar to the effect of a 1% decline in 
  data,  1984-96    Dummy  variables         unemployment. 
             for state waivers     ▪ Gross job flows (high job turnover) is positively   
Includes state and year fixed effects.  Some estimates include lagged      correlated with higher caseloads. 
dependent variable and first difference models.          
 
 
Blank    Log(AFDC caseloads   Multiple economic    • Share of caseload change due to economic factors: 
(2001a)    per capita)     variables (including      29% in 1990-94 
       unemploymt & wage     59% in 1994-96 
Based on state      information)      • Share of caseload change due to waivers: 
administrative     Dummy variables for     -22% in 1990-94 
data, 1977-96        state waivers       28% in 1994-96 
        •  5%  estimated  change  in  AFDC  caseloads  due  to 
Also includes extensive controls for demographic, program and       1-point increase in unemployment. 
political variables, along with state and year effects.  





Council of  Log(AFDC caseloads   Unemploymt rates    • Share of caseload change due to economic factors: 
Economic    per capita)    Dummy variables for      24% to 31% in 1989-93 
Advisers             state waivers       31% to 45% in 1993-96 
(1997)  Based on state      (looks at overall    • Share of caseload change due to waivers: 
administrative      waiver effects &      13% to 31% in 1993-96 
    data, 1976-96       policy components)    • 3% to 5% estimated change in AFDC caseloads due to 
Also includes state effects, year effects and state time trends.      1-point increase in unemployment. 
 
Figlio &  log (AFDC caseloads   Unemploymt rates    In static models: 
Ziliak      per capita)    Dummy variables for    • Share of caseload change due to economic effects: 
(1999)             state waivers      -10% to 36% in 1993-96 
    Based on state             • Share of caseload change due to waivers: 
  administrative            0%  ro  24%  in  1993-96 
  data,  1976-96        In dynamic models: 
Also includes state effects, year effects, and state time trends.  Dynamic   • Share of caseload change due to economic effects: 
models include first-difference and lagged dependent variables.      18% to 76% in 1993-96 
          •  Share  of  caseload  change  due  to  waivers: 
              -7%  to  1%  in  1993-96   
            •  6%  to  9%  long-run  rise  in  caseloads  due  to 
                1-point  rise  in  unemployment  rate. 
 
Levine &  Log(AFDC caseloads   Unemploymt rates    • Economic effects of same size as CEA (1997) study. 
Whitmore    per capita)    Dummy variables for    • States with waivers have almost twice the caseload  
(1998)             state waivers        reduction but no difference in unemployment rates. 
  Based  on  state 
  administrative 
  data,  1976-96 
Also includes state effects, year effects and state time trends. 
Table 6-continued  
 
 
Moffitt   Log (AFDC participants/  Unemploymt rates    • Reduction in participation due to waivers: 
(1999a)        female population,    Dummy variables for      -1.7 percentage pts among women high school dropouts. 
aged 16-54)       state waivers       -0.8 to –1.0 percentage points among all women. 
    Weeks and Hours of work  (looks at overall    ▪  Among high school dropouts also find significant effects 
    Earnings        waiver effects &       of waivers on weeks and hours of work; no significant 
    Income         policy components)       effects on earnings or income. 
    Based on March CPS data,          • 0 to 0.3 percentage point rise in participation due to  
     aggregated into education &           1-point rise in unemployment rates 
     age cells by state, 1977-95 
Also includes state effects, year effects and state time trends, along 
with demographic controls. 
 
Schiller  AFDC caseload    Multiple economic    • Institutional program operation variables are 
(1999)    growth by state     variables (including       highly significant. 
 unemployment rates    • Programs defined as “tough” produce greater 
Based on state      and per capita income)    caseload reductions. 
administrative    Dummy  variable  for 
data, 1991-96.      “soft” or “tough” state   
        r e f o r m s       
    State  program  operation 
        variables  (approval  rates 
           exemption rates, work 
           assignment rates, etc.) 
Does not include state or year fixed effects. 
 






Wallace &  Log(AFDC caseloads   Multiple economic     • Share of caseload change due to economic effects: 
Blank      per capita)      variables (including      50% for 1990-94 
(1999)             unemploymt and       47% for 1994-96 
    Based on state       wage information)    • Share of caseload change due to waivers: 
    administrative     Dummy variables for      -13% for 1990-94 
    data,  1980-96        state waivers       22% for 1994-96 
Also includes extensive controls for demographic, program and    • 5% to 6% rise in caseloads due to    




Ziliak,   Log(AFDC caseloads/   Unemploymt rates    • No separate estimates of economic effects alone; 
Figlio,         Female population,   Dummy variables for       66% of change due to economic and seasonal 
Davis, &            aged 14-55)     individual policy       factors in 1993-96. 
Connelly  Based on state      components of     • Share of caseload change due to waivers: 
(2000)    administrative      state waivers        -9% in 1993-96. 
data, 1987-96              • 2% estimated change in AFDC caseloads 
Also includes state effects, state time trends, time trends (t, t
2, t
3 ),       due to 1-point increase in unemployment 
and month effects.  Estimated models include lagged dependent         that lasts 5 months. 
 variables and first differences. 
 
Table 6-continued  
 
Part B:  Econometric research on Welfare Reform Impacts Including Data After the 1996 Welfare Reform 
 
  Dependent    Key  Independent   
Study     Variable(s)          Variables      Results on Key Variables 
 
Council of  log(AFDC caseloads    Unemploymt rates    ▪ Share of caseload change due to economic factors: 
Economic    per capita)    Dummy variables       26% to 36% in 1993-96 
Advisers            for state waivers and      8% to 10% in 1996-98 
(1999)   Based on state       TANF implementn    ▪ Share of caseload change due to waivers: 
    administrative     (looks at overall       12% to 15% in 1993-96 
    data, 1976-98        waiver effects &    ▪ Share of caseload change due to TANF: 
  policy components)       35% to 36% in 1996-98 
Includes state effects, year effects, and state time trends. 
 
Grogger  AFDC/TANF      Unemploymt Rates    ▪ TANF and waivers have identical (negative) effects 
(2000)     participation     Dummy variables       on participation, creating a 2.1 percentage point decline 
             for state reforms      (exclusive of time limits). 
    Based on March     (waivers and TANF)   ▪ Time limits have significant negative effects on 
    CPS data, 1978-98     and for time limits       participation in families with younger children. 
Includes state effects and year effects.  Also includes demographic controls. 
Children’s ages are interacted with time limit dummy variables.  
 
Grogger  AFDC/TANF      Unemploymt Rates    ▪ Time limits have significant negative effects on 
(forthcoming)   participation     Dummy variables       TANF participation and positive effects on earnings, 
    Employment measures   for state reforms       especially among women with younger children. 
    Earnings & income     (waivers and TANF)   ▪ No effect of time limits on earnings or income. 
    Based on March     and for time limits    ▪ Significant effect of EITC on welfare use and  
    CPS data, 1978-99    EITC parameters       participation. 
Includes state effects and year effects.  Also includes demographic controls. 
Children’s ages are interacted with time limit dummy variables.  
Table 6-continued  
 
 
Kaushal &  Employment      Unemploymt Rates    • States with both time limits and family caps show 
Kaestner  Hours        Dumy variables      significant increases in employment and hours 
(2001)      Fertility        for family cap and      among married women with children. 
      time limits      • Little significant effects of reform on fertility. 
Based on March    Also codes reforms 
CPS data, 1995-99        by “intensity” 
Difference in difference estimates for unmarried women with children,  
using married women with children and unmarried women without children 
as control groups.  Includes state and year effects and demographic controls. 
 
O’Neill &  AFDC/TANF      Unemploymt rates    ▪ Share of caseload change due to economic factors: 
Hill       participation     Dummy variables       30% in 1992-96;  17% in 1996-99 
(2001)   Employmt last week     for state waivers and    ▪ Share of caseload change due to welfare reforms: 
               TANF implementatn     12% in 1992-96 (waiver period) 
    Based on March              49% in 1996-99 (TANF period) 
  CPS  data,  1982-99.       ▪  Similar  effects  on  employment  changes. 
Includes state effects, state time trends and national time trend.       ▪ Policy effects strongest among younger and  
No year effects included.  Demographic controls included.  Separate       more educated women. 
groups of single mothers by age, education, and race are analyzed. 
Schoeni &  AFDC/TANF      Unemployment or state  ▪ Waivers have a significant effect on AFDC participation, 
Blank      participation       income measures      labor market participation, earnings, income, poverty  
(2000)             Employment measures  Dummy variables       rates, and marital status. 
Earnings measures     for state waivers     ▪ TANF has significant negative effects on welfare 
Income & poverty     and TANF implementatn     participation, larger than the effects of waivers. 
Family structure    (Also measures TANF  ▪ TANF has relatively small but significant effects 
          effects as a pre-post      on earnings, poverty rates, and household structure. 
Based on March CPS      1996 effect)     ▪  Economic factors fully explain labor market changes 
data, 1977-99,                  in the TANF period. 
aggregated into education 
& age cells by state 
Includes state effects, year effects, state time trends.  Also includes demographic controls. 




Wallace &  log(AFDC caseloads    Multiple economic    ▪ Estimated caseload change due to economic factors: 
Blank      per capita)     measures (including       20% to 36% in 1990-94  
(1999)             unemployment and wages)     8% to 12% in 1994-98 
    Based on monthly    Dummy variables for    ▪ Estimated caseload change due to waivers: 
    state administrative     state waivers and         -4% to –5% in 1990-94 
    data, 1980:1-1998:6     TANF implementatn       26% to 31% in 1994-96 
Also includes state-month effects.  Models estimated in first differences   ▪ Estimated caseload change due to TANF: 
with lagged dependent variables.               28% to 35% in 1997:1-98:6  
Part C:  Econometric Research on Welfare Reform Impacts Using Flow Data 
 
  Dependent    Key  Independent   
Study     Variable(s)          Variables      Results on Key Variables 
 
Hofferth,  Prob(exit welfare    Unemployment and     ▪ Unemploymt not linked to welfare exits. 
Stanhope &   conditional on      state income      ▪ Work exemptions for mothers with young children 
Harris     spell duration)    Dummy variables for      increase welfare exits; earnings disregards decrease 
(2001)             individual policy      exits;  other policy components insignificant. 
    Based on monthly      components in state    ▪ Primary policy effects on exits from welfare to work. 
    PSID data on welfare      waivers        Non-work-related exits not affected by policy. 
  spells,  1989-96 
Uses event history analysis.  Also includes demographic controls and state fixed effects 
 
Hofferth,  Prob(Return to AFDC   Unemployment and    ▪ Higher unemployment correlated with welfare re-entry. 
Stanhope &  conditional on time      state income      ▪ Work exemptions for mothers with young children make 
Harris    since leaving AFDC)    Dummy variables for      women less likely to re-enter welfare;  other policy 
(2002)         individual  policy       components  insignificant. 
    Based on monthly     components in state    ▪ Some income increases visible over time among welfare 
    PSID data on post-     waivers        leavers. 
welfare spells, 1989-96 












Klerman &  Log (Caseloads    Unemployment rates    ▪ Standard estimates based on stock data may be biased. 
Haider       per capita)      (No policy effects are    ▪ Simulated effects of economic factors on caseload  
(2000)   Welfare entry rate    estimable since data        changes between 1995-98 range from 12% to 47%. 
    Welfare continuation    is from a single state) 
   r a t e  
  Based  on  monthly 
  administrative  data 
  from  CA,  1989-98 
Develop stock-flow model of caseload change.  Estimates include county and time fixed effects. 
 
 
Mueser  ,  Welfare exit rate    Unemployment rates    ▪ Changes in exit rates explain about 2/3
rds of 
Hotchkiss,  Welfare entry rate    Dummy variables on      the caseload decline in 4 of the 5 cities; changes 
King,              significant state       in entry rates explain 1/3 of the decline. 
Rokicki &  Quarterly adminis-      program changes    ▪ Economic conditions affect welfare exits, not entries. 
Stevens  trative data from 5               (including waiver and  ▪ State waivers reduce welfare exits by 21%; TANF  
(2000)   metro areas,         TANF implementatn)    reduces welfare exits by 11%. 
  early  1990s-97 






Table 6-continued Table 7 
Effects of Financial Incentive Schemes Tested Using Random Assignment 
Third Year Effects 
 
I. Programs with Incentives Only 
Outcome  MFIP Incentive Only  WRP Incentive Only  NY CAP   
Employment (%)  3.6*  0.2  3.3*   
Annual Earnings ($)  -191  -69  523*   
Annual Cash Transfers ($)  1165***  -58  186   
Annual Income ($)  973***  -106  200   
Poverty (%)  -8.3***  n/a  n/a   
 
 
II. Programs with Incentives and Work Requirements 
Outcome  SSP  Full MFIP  Full WRP   CT Jobs First  FTP  Iowa FIP 
Employment (%)  7.2***  11.5***  11.2***  6.4***  8.6***  2.4*** 
Annual Earnings ($)  649***  571*  575*  730***  915***  308*** 
Annual Cash Transfers ($)  800***  614***  -358***  -515***  -293  115*** 
Annual Income ($)  1449***  1185***  199  175  521**  -- 
Poverty (%)  -9.4***  -12.4***  n/a  n/a  n/a
a -- 
 
Sources: Employment, Earnings, Cash Transfers, and Annual Income for all programs except NY CAP and Iowa FIP come from 
Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001, Appendix Tables C.2 and C.3).  Poverty data for MFIP comes from Miller et al (2000, Table 4.5).  
Poverty data for SSP comes from Michalopoulos et al (2000, Table ES.2).  Data for NY CAP program come from DeMarco and Mills 
(2000) and are averages over the first five years after random assignment.  Data for Iowa FIP program come from Fraker and Jacobsen 
(2000) and are averages over the third year after random assignment.  All data in U.S. dollars. 
a The FTP evaluation provides no information on poverty rates, but reports a 6.0 percentage point positive impact on the question 
"usually has enough money at the end of the month" (significant at the 1 percent level). 
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I. Financial Incentives Programs (including 
strong work requirements) 
      
Self Sufficiency Project (SSP), Canada             
Long-term  recipients  $1849  $948  1.95  n/a n/a n/a 
       
Minnesota's Family Investment Plan 
(MFIP) 
      
Single parent urban long-term recipients  $1476  $596  2.48  $2044  $1693  1.21 
Single parent urban recent applicants  $840  $868  0.97  $1193  $1624  0.73 
Two parent applicants  $844  $2088  0.40  $104  $2552  0.04 
       
New Hope Demonstration, Milwaukee, WI  $806  $483  1.67  $2306  $3616  0.64 
II.  Mandatory Employment Programs only             
       
National Evaluation of Welfare to Work 
Strategies (NEWWS, 7 sites) 
      
Maximum (Portland, OR)  n/a  n/a  n/a  $121  $208  0.58 
Minimum (Riverside HCD, CA)  n/a  n/a  n/a  -$509  $798  -0.64 
       
Greater Avenues for Independence 
Program (GAIN, 6 sites in California) 
      
Maximum (Riverside)  n/a  n/a  n/a  $380  -$587  large** 
Minimum (Los Angeles)  n/a  n/a  n/a  -$312  $688  -0.45 
* Includes the total imputed value of all program benefits and services to recipients.  This includes the income gains represented in 
Column 1, as well as the imputed value of health insurance benefits, support services, and fringe benefits.  
** It is difficult to calculate comparable cost-benefit ratios for the GAIN Riverside site, since the program increased income to 
recipients while generating savings to the government in reduced program costs.  In some sense, with government savings the cost-
benefit ratio is infinite.  Of the 6 GAIN sites, 3 increased income to recipients at a cost savings to the government, 2 increased income 
to recipients while increasing government costs, and the Los Angeles program reduced income to recipients while increasing 
government costs.  
 
Sources and notes: 
1.  Dollar amounts are calculated over different years for different programs; all in U.S. dollars.  See sources for details.   
2.  SSP: Michalopoulos et al (2000).  Column 1 and 2 figures come from table ES-1, page ES-7.  Does not include taxes, and 
ignores costs of administering program.  Effects are over 3 years. 
3.  MFIP: Miller et al (2000).  Column 1 and 2 figures come from tables 4.1, 5.1, and 6.1, and present effects over 10 quarters.  
Column 4 and 5 figures come from Table 7.1, and present effects over 5 years.  Both sets of numbers include the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC).   
4.  New Hope: Bos et al (1999).  Column 1 and 2 figures come from Table 5 of the Executive Summary.  Column 4 and 5 figures 
come from Table 8.3.  Effects are over 2 years. 
5.  NEWWS: Program benefits come from Freedman et al (2000), Tables 5.1, 6.1, and 6.2.  Costs come from Bloom and 
Michalopoulos  (2001), and are net of savings in transfer payments (AFDC and Food Stamps), which come from Tables 6.1 and 
6.2 of Freedman et al (2000).  Columns 1 and 2 are not applicable as no additional transfer payments were paid to experimentals.  
Does not include the EITC on either the cost or the benefit side.  Effects are over 2 years.  Riverside ran more than one program.  
The results presented above were from the Human Capital Development (HCD) program, which emphasized education first. 
6.  GAIN: Riccio, Friedlander and Friedman  (1994).  Columns 1 and 2 are not applicable as no additional transfer payments were 
paid to experimentals.  Column 4 and 5 figures come from Tables 6b and 7 of Executive Summary.  Effects are over 5 years.  
Table 9 
 
Research on the Effects of Welfare Reform on Family Structure and Fertility 
 
 
Part A.  Econometric Estimates of Waiver and TANF Effects 
 
Study     Data    Dependent  Var Key  Independent  Var   Results 
 
 Fitzgerald and Ribar    SIPP panels    Female headship  Welfare waivers  •  Waivers don’t affect headship    
(2001)     1990, 1992, 1993    *Levels    (Aggregate and     levels 
                *Exits from and   by policy component) • Waivers increase exits from and 
              entries to headship             reduce entries to headship   
             •  Estimated  effects  of  waivers  by   
                   policy  component  often  show   
                   w r o n g   s i g n     
   
Horvath-Rose and Peters   State administrative  Nonmarital birth   Welfare waivers  •  In aggregate, waivers reduce  
(2001)     panel data     ratios       (aggregate and      nonmarital births 
        1984-96          by policy component) •  Family caps have negative and 
                       significant  effect 
             •    Minor  parent  provisions  have 
                     significant  positive  effect 
                •    Few  effects  of  time  limits,   
                     AFDC-UP  or  work  requiremts   
 
Kaushal and Kaestner   CPS data    Childbearing     Family caps and  •  No significant or credible effects 
(2001)     1995-99          time limits        of family caps or time limits on   
                    childbearing  among  single     
                     mothers  with  children.  
Table 9-continued 
  
Schoeni and Blank    CPS data,      Among all women:  Welfare waivers   • Waivers reduce headship 
          (2000)      aggregated to state    *Share who         (aggregate effects)      and increase marriage 
level, 1977 – 1999      head households  TANF implementa-   • TANF reduces headship        
        *Share married       tion       
 
Part B.  Econometric Estimates of the Effects of Family Caps 
 
Study     Data    Dependent  Var Key  Independent  Var   Results 
 
Acs  (1996)      NLSY     Probability of    Incremental AFDC  • Negative effect, but insignificant 
        Women w/ at least  higher order birth  benefits 
    one  child 
 
Argys, Averett and    NLSY     Probability of    Incremental AFDC  • Positive significant effect on 
Rees  (2000)       pregnancy  and   benefits      pregnancy,  unless  state 
       abortion          fixed  effects  are  included 
          •  No  effect  on  abortion 
 
Fairlee and London    SIPP      Probability of    Incremental AFDC  • Few effects on births 
    (1997)      1990      higher order birth  benefits 
    Women  w/  at  least 
    one  child 
 
Grogger and Bronars    Census     Time to    Incremental AFDC  • No significant effects 







Part C.  Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Welfare Reform on Family Structure and Fertility 
 
Experiment    Location and Years    Nature of Intervention   Results 
 
A Better Chance  Delaware       Mandatory job search   •  Few effects on marriage 
(ABC) Demonstratn    5 sites       2-year time limits    • Cohabitation increases among less skilled 
Fein (1999)    Experiment:  1995-96    Earnings disregards      and younger mothers 
      Final evaluation:      Strong sanctions    • No fertility effects 
  18 months out     Family caps      • Reduced enthusiasm for childbearing 
Work supports 
 
California Work  California                                Reduced benefit levels  • Significantly more married couples  
Pays Demonstratn          4 sites                                   Increased BRRs        stay together. 
Hu (2000)                   Experiment: 1992-96                                                              • No significant effects on single  
                                    Evaluation includes                                                                   women’s marriage or cohabitation 
                                    data thru 1997                                                                            rates. 
 
Family Developmt  New Jersey      Family cap program    • Birth rates 9% lower 
Program    1994-95      Earnings disregards     • Increased family planning use 
Camasso, et. al.          Work supports     • No change in abortions 
(1998a  and  1998b)      Two-parent  families 
         given  better  access  to  AFDC 
 
Minnesota Family  Minnesota      Work mandates    • Increased marriage among single 
Investment Program    7 sites      Large earnings disregard      long-term recipients 
Miller, et. al. (2000)  Experiment:  1994-96   Service coordination    • Reduced separation among married 
   Final  evaluation:               two-parent  recipients 




New Chance    10 states      Comprehensive services  • Increased instability in living arrangements 
Quint, Bos, and     16 sites      (education, employment  • No effect on pregnancy, births, or 
Polit (1997)    Experiment:  1989-92   and life planning) to         abortions 
      Final evaluation:     AFDC recipients who  
         3½ years out     were teen mothers and 
       high  school  dropouts 
 
Teen Parent     Illinois and NJ     Mandatory participation in   • More births in experimental group 
Demonstration Project    3 sites      employment, education, and    (an unexpected effect) 
Kisker, Rangaranjan,  Experiment:  1987-91   life planning assistance 
and Boller    Final evaluation: 
(1998)        6½ years out 
 